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Statement of Problem: Despite significant progress over the last decade in 
expanding access to basic health services in Afghanistan, utilization of maternal and 
child health services remains low. First introduced in Latin America and now 
expanding to countries in Africa and Asia, conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs, 
which provide monetary incentives to households meeting certain behavioral 
requirements, show promising results. While evidence in favor of CCT for low-
income and middle-income countries is growing, little is known about the effects of 
CCT in post-conflict settings where resources are stretched, service provision is 
limited, systems are fragile, and security is tenuous.  
 
In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Public Health (MoPH), in collaboration with the 
Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), launched a conditional cash 
transfer project from 2009 to 2011 to increase utilization of institutional delivery and 
DPT3 vaccination. The program included four intervention arms: in the household 
arm, women received 300 AFNs for delivering at a health facility and 150 AFNs for 
bringing her child into the clinic for DPT3 vaccination. In the community health 
workers (CHW) arm, CHWs received 150 AFNs per completed referral for DPT3 and 
institutional delivery. In the combined arm, both households and CHWs received 
incentives for delivery and DPT3 vaccination. Finally, in the control arm, no 
incentives were provided.  
 





association of the three incentive schemes on institutional delivery and DPT3 
vaccination in Afghanistan, and (2) to understand implementation factors that may 
affect program outcomes. 
Methods:  Concurrent mixed-methods approach was used to assess program 
outcomes and to gain a better understanding of the implementation factors. Data 
sources include cross-sectional household survey, in-depth interviews, document 
reviews, and health facility assessments. To assess the association of the cash 
incentive schemes on service utilization, I used a mixed-effects logistic regression 
model with inverse probability weighting to account for differentials in sample 
characteristics due to non-random selection of study arms through quasi-experimental 
design. To better understand contextual and implementation factors, I conducted 
content analysis. Findings were integrated in the analysis phase and formed the basis 
for program recommendations to policy makers.  
Key Findings:  Quantitative analysis provided mixed findings.  Positive associations 
between cash incentive and program outcomes (DTP3 vaccination and institutional 
delivery) were observed in the household arm where families received cash after they 
had utilized the services. However, cash payments to CHWs for DPT3 and 
institutional delivery referrals appear to have no effect on service utilization. Finally, 
in the combined arm where both CHWs and households receive cash, I observed a 
negative association in the combined arm for institutional delivery, and a positive 






Substantial variation in program outcome at the village level were noted, suggesting 
that unobserved health systems and contextual factors are likely to influence program 
outcome. This finding is supported by qualitative data. As a result of the limited 
technical capacity of the organization contracted to implement the CCT project, 
health facility staff used a variety of strategies to manage delays in cash 
replenishment and to ensure communities knew about the program and understood 
the benefits. Despite challenges, most interviewed stakeholders were positive about 
the program, indicating that CCT may be an acceptable demand-side intervention in 
Afghanistan.  
 
Conclusions:  Findings suggest design, implementation, and evaluation of CCT 
program in low-resource settings require careful consideration. Program design needs 
to be informed by a sound feasibility study, and the implementation process should be 
closely monitored. Further studies are needed to provide the Ministry with more 
robust evidence on the efficacy and effectiveness of CCT interventions to increase 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Rationale and Research Questions 
Despite significant progress over the past decade, Afghanistan continues to have poor 
maternal and child health indicators. According to Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) 
estimates from 2006, between 1600 and 2000 women died each year due to pregnancy-
related complications per 100,000 live births, and the mortality rate for children under 
five years of age was 191 deaths per 1000 live births.[1, 2]  While MoPH has made 
progress toward improving access to health care and quality of services, utilization of 
maternal and child health services remains low.  
 
In response to this, MoPH, in collaboration with the Global Alliance for Vaccines and 
Immunization (GAVI), launched a two-year conditional cash transfer project from 2009 
to 2011. The pilot project provided cash incentives to households when the woman gave 
birth at a government facility, and when a child received the third dose of Diphtheria-
Pertussis-Tetanus (DPT3) vaccination at the facility. In addition, the government 
provided monetary incentives to community health workers (CHWs) for each completed 
referral for institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccination.  
 
Broadly put, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) are policy levers that use monetary 
incentives to influence household behaviors. The first CCT program was piloted more 
than 20 years ago as a response to the financial crisis in Mexico. What started as a small 





government’s social policy, reaching five million individuals (more than 30% of the 
population). The success of the CCT program in Mexico has led to rapid adoption of 
CCT programs in many parts of the world and in contexts as varied as India [3], Nepal 
[4],  Zimbabwe [5], Turkey [6], Myanmar [7] and the United States [8], and for a wide 
range of interventions.  According to a 2009 World Bank study, more than 40 countries 
have implemented CCT programs.[9]  
  
Despite the growing body of evidence in support of CCTs, important research and policy 
questions remain. In particular, little is known about the effect of conditional cash 
transfers with health service utilization in post-conflict settings where resources are 
stretched, service provision limited, systems fragile, and security tenuous.  
 
The two objectives of this study are:  
1) to assess the association between cash incentives and utilization of DPT3 
vaccination and institutional delivery, and 







A major crossroad linking Europe and Asia, Afghanistan is a land-locked country with an 
estimated population of 35 million people. Nearly four decades of war have depleted the 
country of its human resources and destroyed much of its infrastructure. By the end of 
Taliban rule in 2001, only one-third of the population was literate, less than 40% lived on 
less than one dollar a day, and a majority of adults reported having been displaced at least 
once in their lifetime.[2, 10]  Early reconstruction efforts were largely successful and 
have led to improvements in key areas, including health, education, infrastructure, 
agriculture, and economic growth. Nevertheless, the country continues to face a complex 
array of political and socio-economic issues, and security continues to be fragile. 
 
Economic Growth 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of economic development in Afghanistan. The economy 
grew at an annual average of 9.2% from 2002 to 2012. From 2009 to 2011—the period 
when the CCT pilot was implemented—GDP per capita increased by 22%, from $461 
USD in 2009 to $550 USD in 2011.[11] The impressive growth, however, belies a faulty 
foundation. The service industry, which accounts for more than half of the economy, is 
financed largely by development aid. Agriculture is the second largest industry, 
employing more than 40% of the population. However, poor infrastructure, along with 
limited capacity to store and package products to meet international standards, is 
hindering the country’s ability to export goods. As a result, most outputs are limited to 
domestic consumption. Finally, manufacturing and mining comprise the third largest 





sustainable economic growth in the coming years.[12] According to a widely publicized 
study, Afghanistan sits on over $1 trillion worth of natural resources, including natural 
gas, petroleum, copper, coal, and semi-precious stones.[13] Strategic investment in the 
mining industry will be critical in the coming years, as the country aims to generate more 
domestic revenue and reduce reliance on foreign aid.  
 
Despite the country’s overall positive economic performance, most Afghans - particularly 
those living in rural areas - remain poor and continue to face daily challenges to survive. 
According to findings from two rounds of the National Risk and Vulnerability 
Assessment (NRVA), a nationwide household survey that measures living conditions in 
Afghanistan, the percentage of Afghans that are either below or hover at the poverty line 
remained unchanged between 2007 and 2011. [10, 14]  According to the 2007-2008 
NRVA survey, 36% (CI 34.94, 37.60) of the population lives below the poverty line, and 
according to the 2011 – 2012 NRVA survey, 35.8% (CI 34.14, 37.40) of the population 
remains below the poverty line. [15]  
 
Geography 
Afghanistan consists of 34 provinces covering a wide range of topographies. The country 
is divided into three geographic regions: the Central Highlands, the Southwestern 
Plateau, and the Northern Plains. The Northern Plains and Central Highlands cover more 
than two-thirds of the country’s land mass and are marked by rugged terrain and harsh 
climates. Severe winter storms and frequent droughts, coupled with poor road 





in those parts of the country. The United Nations Office for Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (UN-OCHA) estimates that between 1 and 2 million Afghans have 
little or no access to essential health services during the winter months. [16, 17]  
 
Security 
Insecurity, resulting in civilian casualties and attacks on health care workers and 
facilities, can impact a health system in several ways; it increases the need for health 
services while limiting access to services. According to the United Nations Assistance 
Mission to Afghanistan (UNAMA) annual report, civilian casualties have been on the rise 
since 2006. Since 2007, the “humanitarian space,” defined by UNAMA as the ability of 
NGOs to provide social services, has shrunk considerably. By 2010, large parts of the 
south and central regions of Afghanistan were classified as “extreme risk, hostile 
environment” not suitable for continuous provision of services. [5]   
1.3 Maternal and Child Health in Afghanistan  
Despite the fragile security climate, Afghanistan has made significant improvements in 
maternal and child health. Table 1.2 provides an overview of progress to date on 
maternal and child health, as measured through successive large-scale household surveys 
conducted over the past 15 years.  They include:  
 Two rounds of the Reproductive Age Mortality Survey (RAMOS). The 
first study was conducted in 2002 and the second conducted in 2011; 
 Two rounds of the Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS). The first 
survey was conducted in 2003 and the second conducted in 2010; 





 Two rounds of the NRVA survey. The first survey was conducted in 2007 
and the second conducted in 2011; and 
 The Afghan Mortality Survey (AMS), conducted in 2011.   
 
Findings from the surveys, along with qualitative studies, provide an overview of trends 




During Taliban rule, very little was known about maternal health in Afghanistan. Shortly 
after the fall of the Taliban regime, Bartlett and colleagues were among the first teams of 
researchers to assess maternal health in Afghanistan. The Reproductive Age Mortality 
Study (RAMOS) was conducted in four provinces - Badakhshan, Laghman, Kandahar, 
and Kabul. The study sites were purposely selected to represent geographic diversity. The 
team estimated that the maternal mortality ratio (MMR) was between 1600 and 2200 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births, and reached a high of 6500 deaths per 100,000 
live births in Badakhshan. Using the verbal autopsy method, the team concluded that the 
main causes of maternal death were ante-partum hemorrhage, pre-eclampsia/eclampsia, 
and obstructed labor. [18]  
 
Following the RAMOS study, the next set of surveys was conducted between 2006 and 
2008. The NRVA and the AHS both sought to better understand patterns of health service 
utilization among women for themselves and their children. While the findings suggested 





women in urban areas, the percentage of women who delivered in the presence of a 
skilled birthing attendant remained low. According to the AHS, 19% of women delivered 
with the assistance of a skilled birthing attendant, and 15% of women delivered at a 
health care facility. [2] While the NRVA survey reported slightly higher numbers - 24% 
of respondents reported delivering in the presence of skilled birthing attendants - findings 
showed that unattended home deliveries remained the norm in most parts of the country. 
[10] 
 
In both surveys (AHS and NRVA), education, distance to health facility, and economic 
status were found to be strongly associated with utilization of a range of maternal 
services, including antenatal care, delivering in the presence of SBA, delivering at a 
health facility, and postnatal care. [2, 10, 19]  
 
The most recent set of surveys—AMS conducted in 2010, and second rounds of MICS as 
well as the NRVA conducted in 2011—showed significant improvements in service 
utilization and maternal health outcomes. According to AMS, MMR dropped from 1600 
maternal deaths per 100,000 live births to 327 per 100,000 live births, and institutional 
delivery increased three-fold, from 9% to 33%. [20-23] However, it should be noted that 
there are considerable controversies on the AMS mortality estimates, with some experts 
stating that the findings are “implausible and invalid.” [24, 25]  Despite controversies 
around the AMS estimates, there appears to be consensus among policy makers, 
academics, and implementers that maternal and child health status have improved over 







Much like maternal health, there have been steady and notable improvements in child 
health outcomes.  In 2004, the under-5 mortality rate (U5MR) was estimated to be 191 
deaths per 1000 live births, and by 2010 U5MR dropped to 97 deaths per 1000 live births. 
Similarly, the infant mortality rate (IMR) was 129 deaths per 1000 live births in 2004, 
and dropped to 74 deaths per 1000 live births in 2010. [20, 26]  If the trend continues, the 
country is well on its way to achieving targets for MDGs 4 and 5 by 2020.  
 
According to the AMS, the principal causes of child death (excluding neonates) were 
acute respiratory infections (31% of deaths), followed by other serious infections (16%), 
injuries (13%), and diarrhea (10%).  Social-demographic factors—such as distance to 
facility, relative wealth of the household, and mother’s education—were found to be 
associated with under-5 child mortality. For instance, the risk of dying for children born 
to a family in the highest wealth quintile was half of those born in families in the poorest 
quintile (49 and 196 per 1000 live births, respectively). [20, 27] 
 
Immunization 
One of the most cost-effective interventions to reduce infant and child mortality is 
immunization.[28] In Afghanistan, the Expanded Program on Immunization (EPI) was 
launched in 1978.  However due to ongoing warfare and political instability, the program 
was administered in an ad hoc manner with little consistency in terms of timing of the 





support of UNICEF, revived the EPI program and made the provisioning of routine 
vaccination a priority. Over the past decade, the government has invested in public 
awareness campaigns, strengthened the EPI supply chain, trained vaccinators, and 
engaged CHWs to increase community awareness. As a result, coverage of Bacillus-
Cereus-Guerin (BCG), Polio, and Measles vaccination improved.[2, 20, 29] 
 
Coverage of DPT vaccination, however, continued to lag behind.  According to the MICS 
2003 study, the overall rate of DPT3 immunization was estimated to be 34.6%. When the 
MICS survey was repeated in 2010 using the same methodology, the team found only a 6 
percentage point increase, to 40.2%.[19] A couple of reasons may explain the slow 
progress. First, DPT vaccination requires three doses and is routinely given at health 
facilities rather than through special campaigns. While most children receive the first 
dose of the vaccine, a much smaller percentage completes the full course. Second, DPT3 
vaccination is difficult to measure. Many families in Afghanistan do not maintain a 
vaccination card, and patient record system is non-existent in most health facilities in 
Afghanistan. As a result, most measurement of DPT3 relies on mother’s recall, which 
may not be entirely reliable.  
1.4 Health System in Afghanistan 
Shortly after the fall of the Taliban, the government began the monumental task of 
rebuilding the health care system. The once loosely linked web of clinics, hospitals and 
vertical programs run by local and international non-governmental organizations was 
replaced by a structured system of service provisioning and financing on the public side, 






In 2002, the Ministry of Public Health, in collaboration with NGOs and development 
partners, designed an essential package of health services to address the most pressing 
health needs of Afghans. The Basic Package of Health Services (BPHS) includes 
maternal and newborn health, child health, nutrition, communicable diseases, mental 
health, disability, and pharmaceutical supply, all delivered at the primary and secondary 
care level. In 2005, MoPH designed the Essential Package of Hospital Services (EPHS), a 
set of complementary services to be provided at tertiary care facilities. Together, BPHS 
and EPHS represent a set of standardized services that are provided free of charge to 
Afghans through the public health care system. The structure of the system is further 
described in Appendix 1. [30] 
1.5 Afghanistan’s Conditional Cash Transfer Project Design
1
 
The objective of the CCT project is to increase utilization of maternal and child health 
services. The pilot was implemented in 16 purposively selected districts across four 
provinces: Badakhshan, Kapisa, Faryab and Wardak from 2009 to 2011.  
 
Description of the Incentive Schemes 
The CCT project tested the following incentive modalities: cash to households, cash to 
community health workers (CHWs), and cash to both households and CHWs. Sixteen 
districts across four provinces participated in the pilot program. Within each province, 
four districts were purposively selected and assigned to one of the following intervention 
arms: control arm, household arm, CHW arm, and combined arm.  
                                                 
1






Below are descriptions of the incentive schemes and participating districts for each arm:  
 Household Incentive Arm: Families were given 300 AFN (~ $6 USD) when a 
woman delivered at a public health facility and 150 AFN (~ $3 USD) when a 
child received the third and final dose of DPT vaccination (commonly referred to 
as DPT3).  
The following districts participated in the household arm:  
o Badakhshan Province  - Teshkan District 
o Faryab Province - Qurghan District 
o Kapisa Province  - Hesa Awal Kohistan District 
o Wardak Province - Chak District 
 
 CHW Incentive Arm: 150 AFN were paid to CHWs for each completed referral 
for institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccination. In these districts, no incentives 
were given to households.  
The following districts participated in the CHW arm:  
o Badakhshan Province - Shuhada District 
o Faryab Province - Khowaja Sabzposh District 
o Kapisa Province - Hesa Dowan Kohistan District 
o Wardak Province  - Jarlrez District 
 
 Combined Arm: Both households and CHWs were provided incentives. 
Households were given 300 AFN when a woman delivered at a government 
health facility and 150 AFN per child receiving DPT3 vaccination. CHWs were 
given 150 AFN per completed referral for delivery and DPT3.   
The following districts participated in the combined arm:  
o Badakhshan Province - Keran District 





o Kapisa Province - Kobhand District 
o Wardak Province – Hesa-I-Behsod District 
 
 Control Arm: No incentives were provided to CHWs and families.  
The following districts were selected as the control arm:  
o Badakhshan Province - Khash District 
o Faryab Province - Seren Tajab District 
o Kapisa Province - Nejab District 
o Wardak Province  - Sayed Abad District 
 
Table 1.3 provides a schematic overview of the pilot design  
 
Selection of Pilot Sites 
MoPH and HWW used a non-random method to select districts and allocate intervention 
arms.  Participating districts were purposely selected in two stages. In the first stage, four 
provinces that provided geographic and ethnic variations were selected: Badakhshan, 
Kapisa, Wardak and Faryab.  Badakhshan and Faryab are located in the northern part of 
the country bordering Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, respectively. Kapisa and Wardak are 
smaller provinces located in the center of the country, close to Kabul. It should be noted 
that Wardak was selected to replace Ghor province, after MoPH concluded that there 
were not enough midwives in Ghor to implement the pilot. [39]  
 
In the second stage, all districts in the selected provinces that met selection criteria at the 
time of program implementation (2009) were eligible to participate in the pilot project.  
According to the GAVI Project Summary report, the selection criteria
2
 included: 
                                                 
2
 The original set of criteria for selection of Districts included (1) Districts with road facilities and (2) 
Districts that are generally geographically close to the provincial center for easier data collection and 





 Availability of active BHC and CHC facilities 
 Availability of active CHW system 
 Full coverage of target areas with midwives and/or physicians (female medical 
staff)  
 Availability of DPT3 current stock 
 Districts that were relatively secure from violence 
 
Four districts within each province were selected and assigned to one of the intervention 
arm. It should be noted that the final selection of districts was a result of negotiations 
among central and provincial staff, rather than an attempt to ensure intervention and 
control districts are balanced on a number of key characteristics.  For instance, according 
to a central level Ministry staff, a remote district in Badakhshan province was assigned as 
the combined arm because the provincial health officer argued that it was reasonable to 
give CHWs and households in greater needs, opportunities to make additional income. 
Similar rationales were applied to other districts.   
 
Figures 1.3-1.7 provide an overview of the geographic distribution of the districts within 
each province. 
  
As a result of the non-random allocation of pilot districts, notable differences were 
observed between the control and intervention arms. In particular, according to a baseline 
study conducted by Hope World Wide (HWW) and the MoPH, women who reside in the 
combined arm lived further away from a health facility (average distance of 6.75 KM in 
the control arm vs. 8.89 KM in the combined arm); paid more money for transportation 





arm); and reported fewer visits to the health clinic in the 12 months prior to the survey 
(average number of visit was 1.54 times in the control arm vs. 1.15 times in the control 
arm)   
 
Furthermore, significant differences were noted in birthing patterns among respondents. 
Less than 10% of the women in the combined arm delivered at a health facility. In 
comparison, 43% of the women in the control arm, 34% of the women in the household 
arm, and 42% of the women in the CHW arm reported delivering at a healthcare facility 
for their most recent birth. [40]  
 
Health System Characteristics 
Table 1.5 describes the number and types of health facilities in each study arm. A total of 
49 facilities participated in the CCT project, including 16 health facilities in the control 
arm, 13 health facilities in the household arm, 9 health facilities in the CHW arm, and 11 
health facilities in the combined arm.   
 
A majority of the facilities that participated in the pilot program are basic health centers 
(30 facilities); sixteen of the facilities are comprehensive health centers (CHCs) and three 
are district hospitals (DHs).  The distribution of CHCs and DHs, were skewed with more 
CHCs and DHs in the control and household arm. In particular 4 CHCs and 2 DHs were 
in the control arm, and 6 CHCs and 1 DH were in the household arm. In comparison, 
health facilities in the CHW and the combined arm were mostly basic health centers 





excluded from the CCT pilot, as these facilities do not have the capacity to provide 
institutional delivery.  
 
Pilot Project Timeframe 
The pilot project was implemented between April 2009 and February 2012. Cash 
incentives were given to households and CHWs from July 2009 to May 2011. An endline 
household survey was conducted from April to May 2011. Finally, health facility 
assessments and in-depth interviews with stakeholders in Kapisa and Faryab were 
conducted from November 2011 to February 2012.  
 
Implementation Organizations  
Table 1.6 lists the organizations that participated in the CCT project implementation and 
evaluation. The Health Economics and Financing Directorate (HEFD) within MoPH 
oversaw implementation and evaluation of the pilot. Hope World Wide (HWW), an 
international NGO based in Kabul, implemented the project, designed the baseline 
survey, and conducted both the baseline and endline surveys. Silk Route Training and 
Research Organization (SRTRO) assisted with the interviews and health facility 
assessments. Finally, Health Systems 20/20 (HS 20/20), a USAID project that aims to 
strengthen health systems, provided technical assistance to HEFD in developing the 
endline survey, training data collectors, and analyzing the data. The implementing 
partners for the Health Systems 20/20 project included Abt Associates, Deloitte 





Broad Branch, in collaboration with SRTRO and MoPH, conducted some of the 
interviews.   
 
Role of the Researcher 
I was hired by Deloitte Consulting in November 2010. One of my projects was to 
provide technical assistance to HEFD, which included support on the CCT pilot 
project. It should be noted that I was not part of the team that designed the project, 
and by the time I joined, the CCT pilot was in its second (and final) year of 
implementation.   
My primary role in this study includes:  
 support the MoPH in designing the household endline survey; 
 design the in-depth interview guides; 
 support the development of training materials for the endline household survey as 
well as interviews in Kapisa and Faryab; 
 develop the health facility assessment form in collaboration with SRTRO;  and   
 participate selected semi-structured and in-depth interviews. 
 
For the quantitative analysis, I conducted the analysis of the household survey. For the 
qualitative analysis, I was part of a team of researchers that conducted the analysis. The 
team included staff from MoPH, Broad Branch, and SRTRO.    
 





GAVI funded the implementation of the project and two rounds of household surveys 
(baseline and endline).  USAID funded the qualitative component of the evaluation as 











       
  
Indicator / Unit 
 






       
  
GDP, current prices / in 
billions USD 
 
11.7 13.3 15.4 17.2 19.2 21.6 
IMF 
(2013) 
GDP per capita, current 
prices / USD 
 
416 461 519 566 616 671 
IMF 
(2013) 
Growth Rate / Percentage 
 
        10%   WB 
Industries 










        20%   
Mining and other 
industries 
 
        26%   
Poverty 
       
  
Proportion of population 
living below poverty line  
 






61%         N/A 
Faryab 
 
29%         N/A 
Kapisa 
 
21%         N/A 
Wardak   41%         N/A 






Table 1.2: Maternal and Child Health Indicators (2009-2013) 
 
Indicator   Value Source (Date) 
     Source 1 Source 2   
Population    31 million    CSO, 2013 









Child Health  
Under 5 Mortality Rate 
(2003)  
 191  MICS 2003 
Under 5 Mortality Rate 
(2010) 
 97          AMS 2010 
DPT3      40% 
    (1) AHS 2006 
    (2) MICS 2011 
Measles     56% 
Polio     48% 




Maternal Mortality Ratio 
(recall period 1999 - 
2002) 





Maternal Mortality Ratio 
(recall period from 2005 
- 2010) 
 327  AMS 2010 
Antenatal Care Coverage 
(1) AMS 2010 
 (2) MICS 2011 
At least once   57% 48% 
At least 4 times   16% 15% 
Assisted Delivery   42% 39% 
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Table 1.3: Conditional Cash Transfer Pilot Design  
 
 
Overview of the CCT Pilot  
 
    
Household 
Arm 
CHW Arm Combined Arm Control 






Delivery 300 AFN 
150 AFN per 
Completed 
Referral 
HH: 300 AFN  
CHW: 150 AFN  
DPT3 150 AFN  
150 AFN per 
Completed 
Referral 
HH: 300 AFN 


































Table 1.4: Demographics and Health System Characteristics  (Pilot Sites, 2010) 
 
PROVINCE   BADAKHSHAN FARYAB KAPISA WARDAK 
Population Characteristics (by Province) 
Total Population  823,000 858,000 399,000 540,000 
Rural  96% 89% 99% 99% 
Female Literacy  22% 22% 23% 10% 
Overall Health Systems Characteristics (by Province) 
BPHS Financing 
Mechanism 




CAF for all 
Districts 
CAF (HH ) 
AADA (CH ) 
SAF 
(Combined) 
CHA (Control) -  
SCA for all 
Districts 
Hospitals  2 3 2 4 
CHC  14 16 8 9 
BHS  34 21 16 26 
Health Posts  387 688 153 176 







Number of Villages   56 13 83 227 
Population   37110 29001 97411 93596 
CHWs  26 40 86 19 





Number of Villages   68 35 62 117 
Population   31,610 47,677 43,232 51,933 
CHWs  14 79 48 No Data 
Combined Arm   Keran  Gurzewan Kobhand Hesa 1 Behsod 
Number of Villages   32 25 99 181 
Population   11,243 72,821 40,730 57,833 






Control  Khash Seren Tajab Nejab Sayed Abad 
Number of Villages   19 90 150 131 
Population   20,413 84,441 No Data No Data 
CHWs   22 90 142 No Data 
HH = Household Arm; CHW = CHW Arm, Combined = Combined Arm 









































































































Table 1.5: Types of Health Facilities, by Province and Intervention Arm 
 
 






Centers and Comprehensive 




Kapisa 3 1 1 
Wardak 5 1 1 
Faryab  1 2 
 Badakhshan 1 
  
Household 
Kapisa 1 3 
 Wardak 3 1 1 
Faryab  1 1 
 Badakhshan 1 1 
 
CHW 
Kapisa 2 1 
 Wardak 2 1 
 Faryab  1 1 
 Badakhshan 1 
  
Combined 
Kapisa 1 1 
 Wardak 4 1 
 Faryab  2 1 











Table 1.6: List of Key Organizations and role in the CCT pilot 
 
Name of Organization Acronym Role 
Broad Branch Associates BBA Evaluation: Broad Branch Associates was part of the HS 
20/20 team. A consultant from BBA assisted with 
stakeholder discussions. Her notes and analysis were used 
as part of the qualitative research  
Deloitte Consulting   Evaluation: Deloitte Consulting was part of the HS 20/20 
team. I was hired by Deloitte Consulting to assist the 
Ministry with the CCT project.  
GAVI – the Vaccine 
Alliance 
GAVI Financing and Design:  GAVI HSS grant funded 
implementation of the CCT project and the quantitative 
evaluation (baseline and endline surveys) 
Health Systems 20/20 
(USAID) 
HS 20/20 Financing: A USAID-funded project on health systems 
strengthening. HS 20/20 consultants were engaged to 
assist MoPH on a range of health system projects, 
including evaluation of the CCT  
Health Economics and 
Financing Department  
HEFD Oversight: HEFD, a department within the Ministry of 
Health. HEFD managed the implementation and 
evaluation of the CCT project 
Hope World Wide  HWW Implementation: HWW implemented the program and 









Chapter 2:  Literature Review 
 
The following literature review provides an overview of developments in maternal health 
and child immunization, and presents evidence on the effectiveness of using financial 
incentives to improve service utilization.   
2.1 Progress in Maternal Health  
Worldwide, approximately 342,900 maternal deaths occur each year in six countries—
India, Niger, Pakistan, Ethiopia, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Afghanistan—
accounting for over half of all maternal deaths.[42] While the timing and cause vary, 
women are at the highest risk of dying during the first 48 hours after delivery from causes 
related to intra- and postpartum complications, including hemorrhage, sepsis, eclampsia, 
and obstructed labor.[43] Evidence suggests that when resources are available, skilled 
delivery is associated with a reduction in maternal risks and is a cost-effective 
intervention to reduce maternal mortality.[44] 
 
The Safe Motherhood Initiative (SMI) in 1987 was perhaps the first, large-scale global 
effort to ensure women’s have access to high quality care throughout pregnancy and after 
birth. A major emphasis of SMI is to ensure the presence of skilled birthing attendants 
(SBAs) at the time of birth.[44-46] These are health professionals who have been 
educated and trained to proficiency in the skills needed to manage normal delivery, and 
in the identification, management and referral of complications. Evidence shows that 






The Millennium Declaration (along with the Millennium Development Goals, or MDGs) 
further ensured that reduction of the Maternal Mortality Ratio (MMR) stayed on policy 
agendas. MDG 5 calls for a reduction of MMR by three–quarters from 1990 to 2015. In 
2006, The Lancet published a landmark series of articles that provided evidence for 
maternal care and financing of services. One key message of the series is that the best 
strategy for reducing maternal mortality is to ensure that women deliver at a health care 
facility, in the presence of an SBA, and with easy access to emergency obstetric services. 
[47]  
 
Despite the policy push toward increasing access to institutional delivery, progress has 
been slow. According to the 2013 MDG Report, the proportion of births assisted by 
skilled personnel only increased by 10% over a ten-year period, from 55% in 1990 to 
66% 2011. Wide regional disparities persists: from near-universal coverage in Eastern 
Asia and the Caucasus and Central Asia (100% and 97%, respectively) to a low of 50% 
observed in Southern Asia and sub-Saharan Africa, the regions with the highest levels of 
maternal mortality.[48]  
 
Studies have shown that while lack of knowledge is a major barrier to access, structural 
and human resource barriers—including difficulty accessing health facilities, limited 
availability of SBAs, and poor financial access—all play a role in the limited gains in 





2.2 Determinants of Skilled Delivery 
At the individual and household levels, a range of factors, including maternal education, 
age, parity, and social economic status are found to be associated with uptake of skilled 
delivery.  
 
Among the factors mentioned, the link between education and skilled delivery appears to 
be the most consistently observed. In contexts as varied as Bangladesh, Tajikistan, 
Indonesia, India, and Cambodia, maternal education is shown to be positively associated 
with the presence of a skilled birthing attendant at delivery.[53, 55, 57-59]  Similarly in 
Afghanistan, Afghan women who have attended school were almost twice as likely to 
utilize maternal services, including antenatal care and facility-based delivery according to 
the Afghan Health Survey. [2] 
 
Age is another factor that is associated with utilization of maternal services. Unlike 
education, this association appears to be context dependent. For instance, a literature 
review conducted by Gabrysch and colleagues found ample evidence that utilization of a 
skilled birthing attendant increases linearly with age [60], while other studies found the 
opposite: younger women are more likely to access skilled care than older women.  
In Afghanistan, studies found that age appears to be a predictor of both skilled birthing 
attendant and facility-based delivery. According to a household survey analysis 
conducted in 2004, researchers found that, compared to women younger than 30 years of 





and for institutional delivery, while women younger than 20 years of age are more likely 
to deliver at a health facility.[22]  
 
Another consistently observed association in Afghanistan for institutional delivery is the 
one between wealth and maternal care. According to findings from AHS, women in the 
lowest wealth quintile are five times less likely to give birth at a health facility. The 
finding is consistent with results from multiple studies conducted over the past 
decade.[22, 61, 62]  In part, the association between wealth and service utilization may be 
due to the high cost of transportation, particularly in rural areas. Indeed, compare to 
women in the urban areas, respondents in rural areas are 3 times less likely to receive 
prenatal care.[2]   
2.3 Progress in Child Vaccination  
Immunization is one of the most cost-effective interventions to prevent child mortality. In 
1974, the World Health Organization (WHO) launched the Expanded Program on 
Immunization (EPI) in an effort to vaccinate children against common childhood 
diseases, including measles, diphtheria, tetanus, polio, tuberculosis, and pertussis. 
According to the WHO guidelines, children under the age of two are recommended to 
receive one dose of Bacillus Calmette-Guerin (BCG), three doses of diphtheria-pertussis-
tetanus (DPT), one dose of measles vaccine, three doses of oral polio vaccine, three doses 







Since the launch of EPI, concerted efforts by governments and development partners 
have led to notable progress. Coverage of DPT3 vaccination is often used as a proxy 
indicator for full immunization, and has increased threefold since 1980, from less than 
20% in 1980 to an estimated 78% in 2011.[63] However, immunization coverage, 
particularly in developing countries, continues to lag behind, with several countries—
Afghanistan, Angola, Central Africa Republic, Chad, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, Niger, 
and Somalia—reporting DPT3 coverage below 50%.[64] 
 
Barriers to immunization in general, and DPT3 in particular, are well documented. On the 
demand side, factors include limited knowledge and/or misconceptions about vaccines 
[43], and costs associated with visits to health clinics [65]. Socio-demographic factors, 
namely mother’s education, gender, and distance from facility, have also been found to 
be associated with uptake of vaccines [66].  On the supply side, a poorly functioning 
supply-chain and limited availability of health professionals are associated with low 
coverage. [67] 
 
In Afghanistan, the overall rates of DPT3 immunization are among the lowest in the 
world. According to the 2011 MICs survey, only 40% of children between 12 and 23 
months of age received all three doses of DPT3.[19] In particular, two characteristics are 
associated with DPT3 vaccination in Afghanistan: family’s economic status and distance 
to facility. In an analysis of the national household survey, Steinhardt et al. found that 
while 60% of children in the wealthiest households completed the full course of DPT 





Her findings support earlier, smaller studies conducted by [68]. While immunization is 
offered free-of- charge to all Afghans, transportation costs and informal payments are 
theorized to influence a family’s decision to bring their children to the health facility for 
the complete course of DPT vaccination.[69] 
 
The second factor is distance to facility. In Steinhardt’s study, she found that only 20% of 
children who live four hours or more from the nearest facility received DPT3, while 
nearly half (47.6%) of children living less than half an hour from the nearest facility were 
immunized for DPT3.[69]  
 
Finally, an issue unique to countries in conflict is the effect of insecurity on 
immunization coverage. In 2003, Mashal et al. utilized GIS data to assess whether 
security has an impact on delivering immunization services. Not surprisingly, the study 
found that, while immunization coverage improved in more stable regions of the country, 
the rates remained stagnant in the southern region of the country, an area that has been in 
and out of Taliban control, despite the presence of a relatively large number of 
vaccinators and health facilities. [70]  
 
2.4 Conditional Cash Transfer 
Conditional cash transfer (CCT) is a type of demand-side financing scheme that provides 
cash to households when conditions are met. CCT programs were first introduced during 
the Latin America financial crisis in the late 1980s. Success in several large-scale projects 
has led to the increased popularity of CCT. According to a 2009 study conducted by the 





elements of conditional cash transfer in their social programs.[9, 71] Today, many 
countries in Latin America have moved from small-scale, proof-of-concept pilots to 
integration into mainstream social policy, providing financial assistance to millions of 
families. Other countries, such as Turkey, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Cambodia, India, and 
Malawi, have piloted programs. [32, 72-74]  
 
Scope and design of CCT vary from country to country. Broadly speaking, CCT schemes 
fall into two general categories: as a replacement for unconditional transfers, and as a one 
–time incentive.[9]  
 
In the first instance, CCT programs replace traditional social safety nets by adding 
conditionalities to obtaining benefits, which are often related to health and educational 
investments. Poor and vulnerable families that regularly receive financial subsidies from 
governments are now required to change certain behaviors in order to receive ongoing 
financial support. Some examples of the conditionalities are regular health checkups, 
school attendance, and job training. [74]    
 
PROGRESSA in Mexico and Bolsa Familia in Brazil are two of the largest programs that 
exemplify this type of CCT. Both are implemented nationwide and in part, as a 
replacement of traditional social safety net programs. Evidence from extensive and robust 
evaluations of both programs shows that CCT are effective policy tool to encourage 






The second type of CCT is more narrowly focused and provides cash incentive for a 
specific, often one-time, activity. India’s Janai Suraksha Yojana (JSY), El Salvador's 
Comunidades Solidarias Rurales, and Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Program (SDIP) 
provide a one-time payment to mothers who deliver at a health facility [31, 32]; 
Tanzania’s RESPECT pilot program offers cash incentives to young people after each 
negative sexually transmitted disease test.[81] And in Myanmar, the government is 
piloting a CCT project to reduce dropout rates for Multidrug Resistant TB patients.[7]   
 
This broad-stroke description of the two types of CCT programs certainly does not cover 
all the variations in designs and ways in which governments, development partners, and 
implementers utilize cash incentive to motivate behavioral change. However, irrespective 
of design, there appears to be consensus that CCT is most effective when governments 
and/or implementers have the ability to provide the services; have the capacity to verify 
fulfillment of cash incentive criteria at limited cost; and have mechanisms in place that 
easily transfer money to the population. [9, 32, 82] 
 
CCT for Institutional Delivery 
While empirical evidence on the use of CCT to increase facility-based delivery is 
emerging, knowledge about the effect of cash transfer on institutional delivery remains 
scant. For this literature search, I found two evaluations of programs that conditioned 
cash payment on institutional delivery, and one evaluation of a program in El Salvador 





Of the programs that provide direct conditionality to encourage institutional delivery, the 
most promising results came from India’s Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) program. JSY is 
a nationwide program that provides a one-time cash incentive to women and community 
health workers for delivering at a government -approved health facility. Lim and 
colleagues analyzed two rounds of District level Health Facility Surveys to examine the 
impact of CCT on outcome (skilled birth delivery) and impact on health status (MMR). 
His team reported a wide range of results across different states – from a 5% increase in 
institutional delivery to an impressive 44%. However, no impact was observed on the 
maternal mortality ratio.[3] 
 
The other study, Nepal’s Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) also aims to use 
cash incentives to increase institutional delivery. SDIP provides cash incentive to women 
giving birth in a health facility, as well as to health providers for each delivery attended, 
either at home or the facility. An impact assessment, conducted by Powell-Jackson and 
Hanson, concluded that the program had a minimal but positive effect on facility-based 
delivery among women who have heard of SDIP. The authors also noted that the 
treatment effect was positively associated with (1) the cash amount offered by the 
program and (2) the quality of care provided at the facility. [52]  
 
Finally, in the study conducted by de Brauw and Peterman, the authors found strong and 
robust indirect impact of El Salvador’s CCT program Comunidades Solidarias Rurales 
(CSR) on hospital delivery. This program does not provide incentives for hospital 





school attendance. The authors found increases in delivery at a facility between 15.3% 
and 22.8% in hospital delivery among program participants. [84] 
 
While I did not find additional peer-reviewed articles on the effect of CCT on 
institutional delivery, a search of gray literature suggests that CCT schemes are being 
piloted in a number of countries, including Haiti, Myanmar and Mozambique.  In 
Mozambique, the World Bank piloted a CCT program that offered women who are in 
their 8
th
 month of pregnancy financial incentives as well as room and board to a nearby 
hospital. While the researchers reported positive trends in service utilization, the program 
was not sustainable given the high cost of program implementation.  In Haiti, the 
government is piloting a CCT program that uses mobile money as the payment 
mechanism. The program is in the early stages of implementation, and to date, no results 
have been released. Finally in Myanmar, Save the Children is piloting a CCT scheme for 
emergency maternal referrals. The program is in the design phase and will be 
implemented in 2016.  
 
It is interesting to note that all three countries mentioned above are considered post-
conflict or fragile state by international agencies including the World Bank and the 
United Nations.  This reflects a growing interest among policy makers and development 
partners to test the effect of CCT as a mean to change behaviors in post-conflict settings.  
Though, more evidence is needed to better guide policy makers in deciding if CCT is the 






CCT for Immunization Coverage 
 While none of the programs reviewed condition payment specifically on DPT3 
vaccination, some of the CCT programs mentioned below require that children receive 
full immunization coverage and/or attend regular health check-ups, which incudes regular 
vaccination.  Below, I provide evidence from three country programs on the effect of 
CCT on coverage of vaccinations.   
 
Among the first programs to incentivize families to bring their children into the health 
facility for vaccination is Programa de Asignacion Familiar, a CCT program in Honduras 
that has been active since 1998. Through the program, families that meet certain 
economic pre-conditions receive on average $17 USD per month if the children attend 
school on a regular basis and have regular health check-ups. While DPT vaccination was 
not specified as a pre-condition, it is routinely given during health check-ups for children 
between 12 and 24 months.  In an evaluation study, Morris et al. reported a slight 
increase in the first dose of DPT vaccination. However, the paper does not report 
progress in completing full course of DPT vaccine. [16]  
 
In Mexico, Barham et al. used the randomized design in Oportunidades to estimate 
program effects on coverage of tuberculosis and measles immunization rates. Small, 
positive effects were observed for uptake of tuberculosis vaccination rates for children 
under 12 months and for measles vaccinations for children between 12 and 23 months 
within the first six months of program implementation. However, no evidence of change 





the author for observing a small increase is that the immunization rate was already high 
(above 90%) before program began.  [85]  
 
In Nicaragua, Barham and Maluccio used program data collected two years after 
implementation of the CCT program to investigate the effect of a CCT program on 
immunization coverage. Red de Proteccion Social (RPS) began in 2000, and conditioned 
payment for health on a range of preventive visits, which included full immunization for 
the children under 2 years of age. The authors found a 6.1% increase in full immunization  
among 12 – 23 month olds. [86] 
 
2.5 Conditional Cash Transfer Projects in Conflict and Post-Conflict Settings 
Post-conflict may be defined as the transitional phase between the end of a conflict and 
establishment of a recognized, stable government. Hamstrung by political challenges, 
weak governing mandates, and limited finances, governments in post-conflict settings 
often cannot provide core functions to the population. [106] 
 
 In my literature search, I found one peer-reviewed study in post-conflict settings. 
Powell-Jackson and colleagues evaluated Nepal’s CCT program, which provided cash 
incentives to women to deliver at a health facility.  As described above, Powell-Jackson 
and colleagues found a small positive treatment effect among women who have heard 
about the program. However, he noted that coverage of the program was low and there 
were many systemic issues with program implementation including unclear guidelines on 






Due to the complexity of, conditional cash transfer programs, which require availability 
of services as well as adequate financial infrastructure as well as management skills, it is 
not surprising that few CCT programs operate in post-conflict settings. Indeed, in a 
review of financing mechanisms in post-conflict settings, Witter noted that supply-side 
challenges is likely to be one of the reasons that there are limited CCT schemes in 




























Nationwide - Pregnant 
woman belonging to poorest 
households, aged older than 
19 years, and for the first 2 
births 
Rs 700 ( ~10 USD) rural 
areas  
Rs 600 ( ~ 9 USD) urban 
areas 




In some states, 
accredited health 
workers are given 
Rs 700 (~ 9 USD) 
in rural areas and 
RS 200 (~3 USD) 







Nationwide - Pregnant 
woman with no more than 2 
living children or have an 
obstetric complication 
NRs 1500 (~ 14 USD) 
mountain areas 
NRs 1000 (~9.6 USD) hill 
areas 




NRS 300 (~ 2.9 
USD) for SBA 
NRS 1000 (~9.6 












Geographic targeting- all 
households in the selected 
municipalities with children 
between 6-15 years of age 
living in the house  
~ 15 USD/month (health 
only) 




 Vaccination  































Geographic and proxy 
means targeting: poor 
families with children aged 
6 - 12 who have not 
completed grade 4, and 
poor families with 
pregnant woman and/or 
children <3 
Lempiras 55/ month (~ 17 
USD/Month) on average - 
Health 
Additional incentives for 
education 

















Geographic targeting: 42 
communities in 6 poor 
rural districts 
Health: $37 every 2 
months 
 
 Regular health 
check-ups for 
children under 2 















among 12 – 23 










Proxy means targeting  US$20 on average   Regular health 
check-ups and 
immunization 
 Health education 




















Chapter 3:  CCT Rational and Study Framework 
 
Rationale of the CCT program  
Direct Cash Incentives to Households 
Like many CCT interventions, the design of the pilot is based on the assumption that 
households under-invest in maternal and child health. Reasons for under-investment are 
many and varied. For some households, decision makers may not be aware of the benefits 
of accessing services, particularly for preventive health such as immunization and 
antenatal care, where benefits may not be immediately realized. For other households, the 
reason may be financial. Households may not have the means to pay for transportation 
and other costs frequently associated with accessing care. CCT projects attempt to alter 
these cost-benefit calculations for some, and provide financial means to access care for 
others. [31, 32] 
 
According to the Afghan government’s health systems strengthening program application 
to GAVI, the rationale for the CCT project is to change perception and behavior among 
households. Afghanistan’s GAVI application states:  “Demand-side financing may be 
useful in overcoming socio-cultural obstacles that impeded the use of the services, 
especially by women. It is envisaged that this is a short-term solution that will only be 
required until women are convinced of the value of the services.” [33]  
 





In addition to cash incentives to households, Afghanistan’s CCT pilot included an 
intervention arm that tested the effects of incentivizing CHWs on service referrals. Much 
like CHWs in many other countries, CHWs in Afghanistan are volunteer health workers 
who do not receive financial compensation. MoPH encourages communities and 
programs to utilize non-financial incentives, such as recognition, training, and career 
advancement opportunities to reward and motivate CHWs.   
 
In Afghanistan, the MoPH, in collaboration with development partners have trained and 
deployed more than 20,000 CHWs countrywide by 2009. According to operational 
research conducted by JHSPH in 2007, only two thirds (67%) of BPHS facilities have 
active CHWs. [34] 
 
There has been a long-standing debate within the MoPH on whether or not to provide 
financial incentives to CHWs.  Increasingly, the argument leans toward providing CHWs 
with financial incentives and integrating the CHWs into the formal health cadre.  Reasons 
given include: increased responsibilities that CHWs have in providing services, critical 
role that CHWs play in linking community’s needs with available services, and a need to 
improve retention among CHWs.  However, others contend that the MoPH does not have 
the financial resources to incorporate CHWs into the health cadre.[34-38]  
 
Despite MoPH’s policy on not paying CHWs, many CHWs do receive compensation 
from other, non-government funding sources. According to interview with staff from 





some programs paid monthly stipends, while others, similar to the CCT project, 
conditioned payment on meeting set targets. In Helmand, for instance, CHWs were paid 
for number of children fully immunized, number of mothers who delivered at the health 
facility and the number of tuberculosis cases detected. [34] 
 
Cash Incentives to CHWs and Households 
 The combined arm of the CCT project provided incentives to both households and 
CHWs. The Ministry hypothesized that in order to increase service utilization, both 
components were needed. CHWs provide the critical link between health facilities and 
communities, and education to the households about the benefits of the services provided 
as well as the CCT program. It is also speculated that knowledge alone is not enough to 
increase utilization. Considering the low level of income in rural Afghanistan, most 
households require financial assistance to pay for transportation and the additional cost 
associated with accessing care.  
 
Evaluation Framework 
Figure 3.1 presents the evaluation framework used to guide the study. The framework is 
adapted from the Integrated Management of Childhood Illness (IMCI) strategic 
evaluation framework developed by the Institute for International Programs (IIP) at Johns 
Hopkins University Bloomberg School of Public Health (JHSPH), and simplified to suit 
the purpose of this study. The framework also incorporates concepts and approaches 





Practical Guide” in which the authors provide an overview of implementation research 
and suggest possible approaches and tools. [88]   
 
Broadly stated, implementation research describes “scientific inquiry into questions 
concerning implementation—the act of carrying an intention into effect, which in health 
research can be policies, programs, or individual practices (collectively called 
interventions).”[89] While the term encompasses a wide range of research topics and 
methods, the goal is similar: to help policy makers and program managers understand 
why an intervention worked (or not), and the mechanisms that influenced the outcome.   
Implementation research is closely linked to monitoring and evaluation (M&E), but they 
are not necessarily the same. Monitoring, when the primary focus is routine reporting of 
the program is typically not considered implementation research. However, monitoring 
using scientific methods to answer implementation research question is considered one 
type of implementation research.  
 
Moving from the top (design) to the bottom (outcomes) of the framework, the pathway 
outlines the relationship between design, implementation, and output. Given the short 
timeframe of the pilot and limitations posed by a post-test only study design (further 
discussed in the limitations section of Chapter 7), I did not assess the impact of the 
program on health outcomes.  
 
In particular, for this study I hypothesize that the starting point of a successful program is 





program to the key stakeholders, and (2) feasibility of implementing the pilot program in 
the selected areas. As such, I focus on these two domains in assessment program design.  
 
Sound design alone, however, is not enough to ensure positive program outcome; 
effective implementation of the program is just as important.  In this study, I explored 
three implementation factors: technical capacity of the implementing organization, cash 
transfer process, and program communication.   
 
For the first implementation factor – capacity of the implementation organization – I 
focused on assessing technical and managerial capacity of Hope World Wide (HWW), 
the implementing agency. HWW was responsible for developing implementation strategy 
based on MoPH and GAVI’s program design, supporting partner organizations (in this 
case – health facilities) in the implementation process, and monitoring progress on an on-
going basis in order to adjust course when necessary.  In addition, HWW was responsible 
for conducting the program evaluation with the objective of providing the MoPH with 
evidence of program effect. The organization play an important role in how the program 
was implemented and influence the outcome of the program.  
 
The two additional aspects of implementation evaluated in this thesis are (1) management 
and disbursement of cash and (2) communication to community members. These two 
factors were selected for a couple of reasons. First, effective implementation of a CCT 
program hinges on end-users knowing about the cash incentive program as well as timely 





program to have the desired effect on service utilization. [4, 8, 90]  Second, one of the 
themes that emerged during the data collection process is the wide variations among 
health facilities in cash payment and communication about the program. This indicates 
that the health facilities played a large role in how well the program was implemented on 
the ground.  Further understanding of how health facilities managed the implementation 
process may contribute to future design and planning of cash transfer projects in 
Afghanistan.   
 
Finally, I used quantitative methods to test the following program output hypothesis:  
 
Control Arm vs. 
Household Arm 
Hypothesis 1a: Compared to women who live in control districts, 
women who live in districts that offer incentives to households 
have higher odds of delivering at a health facility.  
 
Hypothesis 1b: Compared to women who live in control districts, 
women who live in districts that offer incentives to households 
have higher odds of having children who received DPT3 
vaccination. 
 
Control Arm vs. 
CHW Arm 
Hypothesis 2a: Compared to women who live in control districts, 
women who live in districts that offer incentives to CHWs for 
each completed referral have higher odds of delivering at a health 
facility. 
 
Hypothesis 2b: Compared to women who live in control districts, 
women who live in districts that offer incentives to CHWs for 





receive DPT3 vaccination. 
 
 
Control Arm vs. 
Combined Arm 
Hypothesis 3a: Compared to women who live in control districts, 
women who live in districts that offer incentives to both CHWs 
and households have higher odds of delivering at a health facility. 
 
Hypothesis 3b: Compared to women who live in control districts, 
women who live in districts that offer incentives to both CHWs 
















































































Chapter 4:  Methodology 
 
4.1 Mixed-Methods Approach 
A mixed-methods approach was employed to assess the CCT pilot program. This study 
approach was selected for a couple of reasons. First, the research questions in this study 
are best answered using both qualitative and quantitative data. The quantitative data 
provide insights into the overall effect of the program as well as variations among 
villages, while the qualitative data provide context and a more nuanced understanding of 
how the program was implemneted. In particular, I explored acceptability of the program 
by the stakeholders and feasibility of implementing CCT for institutional delivery and 
DTP3 vaccination in selected districts. As well, I described how program was 
implemented at the heath facility level and variations in implementation approach. 
Second, using both qualitative and quantitative method to evaluate the CCT program 
allow for triangulation of data. This is particularly useful in conflict-settings, when often 
it is not possible to return to the data collection sites to validate findings. In Afghanistan, 
this was certainly the case. With the exception of interviews conducted in Kabul, I was 
not able to follow- up with interviewees for clarification and/or follow-up discussions.  
 
In this study, quantitative and qualitative data were collected in parallel and integrated, or 
‘mixed’, during the analysis stage with the goal of obtaining “different but 
complementary data on the same topic for the research question” [91].  Qualitative data 
was collected over a one-year period, from January 2011 to February 2012, while 





the analysis stage, with equal emphasis given to data collected through quantitative and 
qualitative methods. Table 4.1 provides a description of all data sources and research 
questions answered by each data source.  
4.2 Data Sources 
 
Quantitative Data  
 
MoPH and HWW conducted an endline household survey to assess the association of 
conditional cash transfer with the outcome of interest: coverage of DPT3 vaccination and 
institutional delivery. The following section describes key elements of data collection, 
including sampling, the survey instrument, data collection and the input process, and 
quality assurance.   
 
Sampling 
A multistage sampling method was used to select 6,130 women between the ages of 15 
and 49 who gave birth to at least one child between July 2009 and March 2011, and 
resided in one of the study districts at the time of interview. Sampling occurred in three 
stages.  First, a sample of villages was selected in each of the four districts with 
probability proportional to size (PPS).  Then, a sample of households was selected from 
each village. The survey team (HWW) did not have the capacity and resources to conduct 
household enumeration; instead, the team interviewed every fifth house, starting from a 
pre-designated landmark (usually school or government office) in each direction (i.e., 
North, South, East, West) until the predetermined number of households for the village 





random in each household using a draw-card method.  All eligible respondents from the 
selected household were asked to draw a card from a box, and the individual who drew 
the card marked ‘survey participant’ was invited to participate in the survey.  
 
The sample size was calculated to detect a 5% difference between control and 
intervention districts using the following parameters: institutional delivery rate of 15 per 
100 births at baseline, design effect of 1.5, and a 5% non-response rate (See Table 4.2). 
Due to deteriorating security in Wardak and parts of Faryab provinces, 15 villages in our 
sampling frame were replaced through a random selection process. An additional 125 
interviews were conducted. In total 6,255 women participated in the study.   
 
Household Survey Instrument 
The design of the questionnaire was based on the following sources:  
1) A Household survey developed by the Johns Hopkins Bloomberg School of Public 
Health  (JHSPH) for the Results Based Financing (RBF) Project  
2) UNICEF’s Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS) 
3) Evaluation tools used in Mexico’s CCT program, Oportunidades  
 
The endline household questionnaire consists of two parts: a Household Questionnaire 
and a Woman’s Questionnaire.  The Household Questionnaire was used to list all the 
household members and to identify eligible women for the individual interview. For each 
member of the household, the team collected basic information, including age, sex, and 





the household’s dwelling unit, including type of toilet facilities, materials used for the 
roof and flooring, and ownership of assets were collected, and used to develop the wealth 
quintile.   
 
The Woman’s Questionnaire was used to collect information from married women ages 
15-49 who had given birth between July 2009 and March 2011, on their age, education, 
ethnicity, pregnancy history, birthing history, survival status of their children, children’s 
vaccination, perceived security, perceived distance to facility and health service 
utilization.  For the outcome measures, women were asked where they gave birth (home 
or health facility) for children born between July 2009 and March 2011. Women were 
also asked whether their children under the age of 2 had received the third dose of DPT 
vaccination.  
 
Finally, for women in the household and the combined arm who were aware of the 
conditional cash transfer project and either delivered at a facility and/or brought their 
children for DPT3 vaccination, additional questions were asked about their decision-
making process, the amount they received, and whether the cash incentive played a role 
in their decision to utilize services.  
 
Data Collection and Data Input Process   
From April to May 2011, the HWW team conducted the endline household survey. Each 
field team consisted of 3-5 staff and one field supervisor who was responsible for 





survey forms were sent to Kabul on a bi-weekly basis. Issues, such as errors, and lack of 
completeness with the survey forms noted during data entry, were discussed at the 
weekly supervisors’ meeting. Often, surveyors were not able to return to the household 
for additional clarification due to security issues or remoteness of the village. Instead, 
identified problems were used as a learning opportunity and basis for small group or one-
on-one trainings to improve data quality.  
 
A team of 15 staff, supervised by HWW, entered the data into an Access database. The 
database has features that flag conflicting information and other possible data entry 
issues. Due to budget and time constraints, double-entry was not possible.  
 
Quality Assurance 
Questionnaires were pre-tested with 64 individuals in Kabul. The purpose of the pre-test 
was to assess suitability of the questions, fine-tune the skip patterns and wording of the 
questions, and assess the length of the interview. Based on feedback from the pre-test, 
three questions were rewritten and two questions were removed from the survey. Once 
the questionnaire was finalized, MoPH conducted a one-week training for 25 surveyors. 
During the training, the surveyors were given an overview of the study, had opportunities 
to practice the questionnaire, learned how to fill out the survey forms, and discussed 
fieldwork logistics. A second, two-day training was held by HWW on data entry, during 
which HWW provided training on the database and discussed the procedure for 







Qualitative Data  
 
To better understand stakeholder perspectives of the CCT program and how the program 
was implemented in different districts, the team collected data from several sources, 
including:  
 Qualitative Data Source 1-3: 96 interviews with stakeholders  
 Qualitative Data Source 4: review of pilot documents (GAVI and HWW 
proposals) and HWW’s quarterly technical reports (24 documents in total) 
 Qualitative Data Source 5: rapid assessments of purposively sampled health 
facilities (9 health facilities) 
Sampling, data collection tool, quality assurance, and staffing for each phase of data 
collection are further described below.  
 
Data Sources 1-3: Discussions and In-depth Interviews 
 
The team conducted interviews and guided discussions with 96 participants over a one-
year period between January 2011 and February 2012. Along with colleagues from 
Deloitte Consulting, Broad Branch, and MoPH, I conducted the first two sets of semi-
structured interviews and discussions (Data sources 1 and 2).  MoPH and SRTRO 
researchers conducted the final set of in-depth interviews in Faryab and Kapisa  (Data 
source 3).  
 
Data Source 1: Program Discussion  
The first set of discussions occurred on January 19-20, 2011 (see Appendix 3 for 





HWW and two from MoPH  met with the study team over a two-day period. 
Participants were purposely selected because of their role in, and knowledge of, 
the CCT program. In particular, the two staff members from HWW who 
participated in the discussion were senior members of the management team and 
in charge of the CCT program, and the two participants from MoPH managed the 
CCT project. The discussions were not guided by a pre-determined set of 
questions. Rather, the team asked open-ended questions with the objective of 
learning as much as possible about the program design and implementation 
process.  
 
Data Source 2: Key Informant Interviews  
The second set of discussions occurred on June 4-13, 2011, with 23 participants 
(see Appendix for summary of discussions). The interviews were conducted by a 
consultant from Broad Branch and MoPH, and guided by a set of key questions 
developed from previous program discussions. I joined majority of the interviews 
as an observer.  
 
Key informants interviewed include HWW staff, staff from the MoPH Maternal 
and Child Health (MCH) and Community Health departments, NGOs 
implementing BHS at the pilot districts, and other health sector stakeholders such 
as the World Bank (WB), JHPIEGO, and the European Commission (EC). Similar 
to the first round of discussions, interviewees were purposely selected to provide 





strategy.  With the exception of interviews with the World Bank, JHPIEGO, and 
EC, which were requested by the study team, the Ministry arranged all interviews. 
The interviews covered a number of implementation topics, including strategy for 
program implementation, stakeholders’ perceptions of the program, and the 
expected impact of the program. These interviews were not tape-recorded. 
Instead, I took notes during the meeting. Findings were compared and discussed 
among members of the study team and presented to MoPH.  
 
Data Source 3: In-depth Interviews in Kapisa and Faryab 
The purpose of the final set of interviews in Kapisa and Faryab was to better 
understand how the program was implemented at the health facility level, how 
households perceived the CCT program, and how cash incentive may (or may 
not) have influenced the care-seeking process.  Using two guides - one for 
households and one for implementing partners–a team of trained qualitative 
researchers conducted 62 in-depth interviews in Faryab and Kapisa provinces, and 
seven interviews with MoPH, NGO, and HWW staff in Kabul (69 interviews in 
total). In the field (Kapsia and Faryab) the team interviewed provincial health 
officers, health facility staff, community health workers, and members of 
households who were aware of the CCT program.  
 
Table 4.3 provides a summary of interviews for Data Sources 1, 2 and 3.  






Sampling   
This study utilized non-probabilistic convenience sampling method to select participants. 
This method does not aim to establish a random or representative sample drawn from a 
population, but rather to select participants who could provide information about how the 
program was implemented at the health facility level as well as overall perception of the 
program.  
 
For data source 3, the following sampling decisions were made. First, the team 
purposively selected Faryab and Kapisa provinces, in part to reflect geographic and 
administrative diversity, and in part, for logistic and security reasons. At the time of the 
study several districts in Wardak were under Taliban control and deemed unsafe for data 
collection by the Ministry of Health program officers. Districts in Badakshan were 
inaccessible due to severe winter storms during the time of data collection.  
 
Within Faryab and Kapisa, the team attempted to sample at least two health institutions in 
the intervention districts. Within each facility the team attempted to interview the health 
facility administrator, 1-2 health service staff that provide obstetric care, 1-2 vaccinators, 
and the facility staff (often the in-charge or head vaccinator) responsible for providing 
cash incentives. To the extent possible, the team tried to select participants to include a 
range of age and gender. However, in most health facilities, there was only one health 
staff in each category.  
 





to interview 3-4 community health workers per district, based on availability of CHWs on 
the day of the site visit. To identify household members who are familiar with the CCT 
program, the team sought CHWs’ advice to identify participants. In advance of field 
visits, one team member from the research team contacted and coordinated with the 
CHW (or CHW supervisors) to identify household members and to seek their permission 
to participate in the study.  
 
The final number of interviews (N=69) was decided based on the following factors: data 
saturation, budget, and timeline. During data collection, the field staff team held 
debriefing sessions at the end of each day. When possible, research team from Kabul 
would join the meeting by conference call. Together, the team decided when data 
collected from each category of stakeholders reached a saturation point. That is, no 
additional variations in practice were noted in the interviews.  
 
Interview Guides 
As mentioned above, the team did not use interview guides for the first two sets of 
discussions (Data Sources 1 and 2). For Data Source 3, two interview guides were 
developed. Interview guides for the program implementers were used to guide 
discussions with provincial health officers, health facility staff, CHWs, and CCT pilot 
implementers to better understand how the project was implemented at the health facility 
level; the context and environment in which the pilot program was implemented; and to 





household was designed to explore household perceptions of the program, the decision-
making process, and overall experience with the program.   
 
The guides were written in English, translated into Dari, and back translated to English. 
Prior to implementation, MoPH officials reviewed the interview guide and provided 
feedback. Over the course of data collection, several questions were amended based on 
feedback from the data collectors. For instance, based on a review of the initial set of 
interviews, the team decided to drop questions about the interviewees’ decision-making 
process and focus instead on program implementation. Furthermore, the team also added 
questions on DPT3 vaccination. After the initial set of interviews in Kapisa, it was 
apparent that more household members knew about cash incentive for DPT3 vaccination 
than for institutional delivery.   
 
On average, interviews were 37 minutes in length, ranging from 13 minutes to 78 minutes 
(see Table 4.4). Discussions with HWW headquarters staff, MoPH, and stakeholders at 
the central level were conducted in English. These discussions were not tape-recorded but 
notes were taken during the meetings.  
 
Verbal consent was obtained prior to interview (informed consent forms included in the 
Appendix) Most interviews in Kabul were conducted in English, and interviews in 
Kapisa and Faryab were conducted in Pashtun or Dari.  With the permission of the 





transcribed and translated into English. Interviewers also recorded voice memos of their 




For the in-depth interviews in Kapisa and Faryab, researchers from SRTRO collected the 
data. Three local researchers (two men and one woman) with experience in qualitative 
research were hired to conduct these interviews. Prior to conducting the in-depth 
interviews, the researchers participated in a week-long, refresher training on qualitative 
interview techniques. Selected members from MoPH also joined the training and 
accompanied the team for a few days during data collection in Kapisa.
3
    
 
During the week-long training, local researchers learned about the study objective; 
practiced using the interview guides and the recording device; and discussed the study 
protocol and time frame for submitting completed memos. An experienced qualitative 
researcher who has managed large-scale studies in Afghanistan supervised the research 
team and was responsible for collecting program documents. Finally, I accompanied the 
study team on selected interviews in Kapisa.  
 
Reflection of my role  
This research study was part of a larger effort by the Ministry of Health to evaluate the 
CCT pilot project. I attended all the interviews in Kabul, and selected interviews in 
Kapisa. Study participants often viewed me, as well as other interviewers, as MoPH staff. 
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This is likely to affect some of our interactions, particularly with individuals who are 
ministry staff as well as health facility staff; respondents may be less open to discussing 
program challenges. To the extent possible, I triangulated the data by reviewing program 
documents and comparing interview findings with results from the household survey. 
Memos and tables were used to track key findings during this process.  
 
Data Source 4: Document Review 
The purpose of the document review is to better understand the implementation process, 
including implementation strategies that worked, well as well as challenges. The 
following project documents were collect from HWW and MoPH: nine quarterly 
technical reports; training and implementation guides; communication tools, including 
posters and information leaflets; and sample log book to track CHW referrals. All 
documents were either provided to me by MoPH or collected during the field visits.  
 
 
Data Source 5: Rapid Health Facility Assessment 
The purpose of the rapid health facility assessment is to gain a sense of supply-side 
readiness of health facilities to provide institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccination, and 
to implement CCT pilot deliver the interventions (institutional delivery and DPT3 
vaccination). The study team conducted health facility assessments at nine facilities (see 
Table 4.5 for a list of facilities). The assessment tool was adapted from JHSPH’s 
Balanced Scorecard and focused only on the following areas: human resources, 
infrastructure, and overall availability (i.e., medicine and opening hours).[92] The 





Scorecard project and familiar with the tool. At the end of each health facility assessment, 
the form was reviewed and signed-off by either the health facility officer in-charge or the 
most senior staff member present at the health facility.    
4.3 Analytical Methods 
Quantitative Analytical Method and Rational for Method Selection 
 
To address the first research question, I used mixed-effects logistic regression to 
simultaneously examine effects of village and individual level characteristics on program 
outcomes.  Standard errors were adjusted for clustering at the village level using inverse 
probability weighting  (IPW) as literature on service utilization in Afghanistan suggests 
that community level factors are likely to affect service uptake. [69, 93, 94, 95 ]   
 
Statistical analysis procedure 
Statistical analysis was conducted in two stages. In the first stage, I conducted 
exploratory data analysis (EDA) to assess the extent and pattern of missing data, 
frequencies, distributions, and outliers. Graphical tools were used to assess 
distribution of continuous variables and to explore frequencies for categorical 
variables. More details regarding treatment of missing data is described below. In 
the final analysis, I conducted compete case analysis, and excluded missing cases.  
 
To examine association of the treatment as well as other individual and household 
level covariates with the dependent variables – DPT3 vaccination and institution 
delivery, I conducted cross-tabs and bivariate analysis. High intraclass correlation 





predictor variables was selected based on conceptual framework informed by 
literature review.  
 
Mixed-effects logistic regression was fitted using maximum likelihood estimation with  
adaptive quadrature to assess the association between treatment and program outcomes, 
accounting for individual and household level determinants, and variation among 
villages.  In the final model, inverse probability weighing derived from propensity score 
was added to the model to reduce any selectivity bias due to non-random selection of the 
study arms. This model provides the best fit for the study as it allows for partitioning of 
the residual variation into two components:  within-cluster and between cluster. Variance 
partition coefficient was used to assess the proportion of the residual correlation 
attributable to differences at the village level.  
 
Description of measurements: individual and household level dependent variables  
 
For the primary analysis, the outcomes of interest are (1) institutional delivery among 
women between the ages of 15 and 49, who have had at least one birth between May 
2009 and May 2011, and (2) DPT3 vaccination of her children below the age of 2 at the 
time of interview.   
 
Both outcome variables were dichotomized. For institutional delivery, a value of  “0” is 
assigned for home delivery and “1” for institutional delivery. For DPT3 vaccination, a 
value of “0” is assigned for the child under the age of 2 who did not receive DPT3 





within the past two years. Mothers of the children below the age of two were only 
interviewed for vaccination coverage questionnaire.  
  
It should be noted for the outcome of interest that respondents may have decided to 
obtain services independent of monetary incentives, and some may have received 
services at health facilities (public or private) that are not part of the CCT incentive 
program. Given the limited number of private facilities in rural Afghanistan, the latter 
was of less concern, with limited impact on the findings. The former—whether 
individuals accessed services because of the incentive program—is further explored in 
both the endline survey and the qualitative interviews.  
 
Description of Measurements: Treatment Variables 
The treatment variable is cash incentive. As described in Chapter 1, this study includes 3 
incentive arm and 1 control arm. Separate analysis was conducted for each of the 
program outcome (DPT3 and Institutional Delivery). It is worth noting that the CCT 
program was not restricted to women who resided in the study districts. Rather, all 
women who utilized health facilities in the household and the combined arms were 
eligible to receive cash incentives. However, CHWs who did not work in the CCT pilot 
facility encashment area did not receive payments for referrals.  
 
Description of Measurements: Independent Variables  
The following covariates are included in the final model:  





a continuous variable. A significant events calendar was developed to aid 
recall.  In this study, women between the ages of 15 – 35 responded to the 
survey. Though difficult to ascertain, the truncation of respondents at age 
35 is likely due to measurement errors. In the final analysis, I transformed 
the variable into four categories: 15 – 19 (reference), 20 -24, 25- 29, and 
above 30 years of age. 
 
 Parity: Women were asked about number of times that she has given birth. 
Data was dichotomized to the following groups: women who have given 
birth to four or less children (reference), and women who have given birth 
to five and more children.  
 
 Education: Women were asked about the highest level of education they 
had obtained. The following categories were created to measure education 
levels: No schooling; Primary (1-6); Secondary (7-9); High school (10-
12); and College (13+).  However, given the limited availability of 
educational opportunities for women in rural Afghanistan, data were 
dichotomized to “No schooling” and “Some Schooling”.  
 
 Socio-economic status: An asset index was constructed based on data 
collected on two main classes of consumption: (i) consumer durables, and 
(ii) housing. Fifteen items were included in the survey, with questions 





such as a mobile phone, radio, and number and types animals. Using the 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) method a relative wealth score was 
calculated for each household. [96, 97] The households were then 
classified in one of five quintiles ranked from poorest to wealthiest.  
 
 Travel time to health facility: Respondents were asked to estimate time of 
one-way travel, on foot, to the nearest health facility, and responses were 
recorded in one of the five categories: less than 30 minutes, 30-60 
minutes, 1-2 hours, 2 hours-½ day, and longer than ½ days.   
 
 Perceived Level of Security: To measure perceived level of security, respondents 
were asked whether they felt safe (or not safe) going to the health facility on a 
five-point Likert scale; 1 represented feeling insecure at all times and 5 
represented feeling secure at all times. Preliminary analysis of the data showed 
that responses fell into two general categories: secure and insecure. As such, I 
transformed the data to a dichotomous variable, with 0 representing “feeling 




Missing independent variables 
In total, only 22 women, less than 1% of respondents, declined to participate in 
the survey.  However, nearly 25% of the surveys have at least one question that 





Table 4.6 provides a summary of missing data and methods for dealing with 
missing data are further described below.   
 
Missing dependent variables 
 I first explored the extent and pattern of missingness of the two dependent 
variables: institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccination. Less than 1% of 
respondents (44 people) did not provide surveyors with information on delivery. 
There were no discernible patterns to the missing value.  To ensure that the 
missing responses have limited impact on the final analysis, I conducted 
sensitivity analysis by comparing results of the model with imputed values, with 
the model that excluded the missing values. No significant difference was 
observed in the findings of the two models. In the final model, missing values 
were excluded from the analysis. 
 
Seven percent of the respondents (N=472) did not provide information on whether 
their children under 2 years of age received the third dose of DPT vaccination. 
This is not unusual as DPT3 vaccination is a difficult indicator to measure: many 
families have difficulties with recalls and/or maintain incomplete vaccination 
records. In this study, less than 20% of the households visited were able to show 
the surveyor visited maintained vaccination records. Among the women who were 
able to provide vaccination records to the surveyor, more than half of the records 
were incomplete or missing key information, such as the name of the child on the 






To better understand the pattern of missing value, I examined the relationship 
between DPT3 and the other key variables in the dataset. I found that a majority 
of the missing data was from Badakhshan (N=451). In 26 villages in Badakhshan, 
surveyors failed to collect data on DPT3 vaccination from all respondents.  
 
Given the extensive amount of missing data from Badakhshan, I decided to 
exclude data collected from Badakhshan in the analysis. By restricting the 
analysis to respondents from Kapisa, Wardak, and Faryab, I am not able to 
generalize findings to the entire study population. Instead, findings are limited to 
understanding the association between cash incentive and DPT3 vaccination 
among households that provided responses in Kapisa, Faryab, and Wardak.  
 
Excluding Badakhshan, in total, 4,699 responses were analyzed for DPT3 
vaccination. This includes 1,175 responses from the control arm, 1,165 responses 
from the household arm, 1,169 responses from the CHW arm, and 1,190 
responses from the combined arm.  
 
Qualitative Analytical Method 
 
A modified Framework Analysis Approach was used to analyze the data.  The 
Framework Analysis was developed by researchers at the National Center for Social 
Research in the United Kingdom over 30 years to assess large-scale policies and 
programs.  This approach is particularly useful in operational research because the design 





instrument and in the analysis. [98] Much like other qualitative methods, the interplay 
among data collection, thematic analysis, and theory refinement is central to this method. 
As well, the role of the researcher is critical to both data collection and the analysis.  
The following steps were used to conduct the analysis:  
 Step 1: Transcription and translation 
With the consent of respondents, all interviews were audio recorded.  In addition, 
interviewers also recorded their reflections of the interview after each session. The 
audio recordings were given to a team of transcribers who utilized a standard 
Microsoft Word document format to transcribe each interview. To the extent possible, 
transcribers were also hired to assist with the translation from Dari to English.  
 Step 2: Familiarization with the interview 
The next step in the analysis process is to familiarization with the data. During this 
stage, I reviewed all the transcripts and reflected on key themes in short memos.  One 
MoPH colleague also participated in this exercise and listened to audio recordings of 
most interviews. We discussed main findings and emerging themes with SRTRO and  
other MoPH colleagues.  
 Step 3: Coding and indexing  
Next, codes were developed and systematically applied to the transcripts using Atlas 
Ti Software. The main purpose of coding is to classify and organize data that would 





explore prior to data collection. The a priori themes formed the skeleton of the 
codebook (Table 4.6) 
As translated transcripts and memos became available, and through discussions with 
the field team, we added new codes to capture emerging themes or to further 
categorize a general theme. For instance, through interviews, it was apparent that 
there were two major areas where health facilities varied from implementation 
design: communication and cash management. Statements about these variations were 
assigned new codes. 
It should be noted that several themes that we had intended to explore, including the 
decision-making process, risk perception, and other areas identified by behavioral 
economists as influencers on how households make decisions, were dropped after the 
first round of data interviews. 
 Step 4: Refining the study framework  
This study did not seek to develop a new framework based on the data collected. 
Rather, I refined the existing evaluation framework based on emerging data.   During 
this step, codes were further grouped into categories, and depicted graphically in the 
study framework (presented in Chapter 3).  
 Step 5: Charting  
Charting involves rearranging the data according to the appropriate part of the 
thematic framework to which they relate, and forming tables and charts. These tables 





Atlas Ti software to help display all statements assigned to certain codes to generate a 
matrix that provides a quick overview of general impressions across the following 
types of interviewees - household members, CHWs, health facility staff, MoPH staff, 
HWW staff, and other stakeholders. Given the large amount of data collected, themes 
were organized in separate spreadsheets.  
 Interpretation 
Finally, I analyzed the qualitative data with the goal of identifying common themes as 
well as divergent views and practices. Quotes that reflect the themes observed were 
selected to illustrate key issues.  Key findings were shared and discussed with MoPH 
staff at the central level.  However, due to budget constraints, I was not able to share 
the results with provincial health officers, and other individuals interviewed during 
the data collection process.  
 4.4 Ethical Considerations  
The Ministry of Health in Afghanistan’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) approved the 
research protocol, informed consent, and survey instrument for the qualitative and 
quantitative study. The Ministry of Health provided written approval to utilize the data 
for this dissertation. Finally, JHSPH’s IRB reviewed and approved my request to conduct 






Table 4.1: Sources of Data  
 
 Sources of Data 
Chapter 5: Association of 
CCT and service utilization  
1. Household Endline Survey   
 6,130 Respondents for Institutional Delivery 
 4,699 Respondents for DPT3 Vaccination 
Chapter 6: Assessment of 
program implementation in 
Kapisa and Faryab 
1. Household Endline Survey 
2. In-depth Interviews  
 96 interviews with stakeholders 
3. Program Documentation 
 Quarterly program reports 
 Photographs of communication materials 
 HMIS data  
      4. Health Facility Assessments 
 
Table 4.2: Sample Size Calculation for Endline Survey 
 
Effect size Sample Size 
3% increase in institutional 
delivery  
8,420 









** Sample size for final survey.   
 
Table 4.3: Number and Characteristics of Respondents in Phases 1, 2, and 3 
 
Phase 1:  Discussions with Stakeholders 
Respondents 
 
Number of Participants, Kabul 
 
Hope World Wide Headquarters 
Staff   
2 
Ministry of Health – Health 
Economics and Financing 
Department  
2 
Total   4 
 
                                                 
4





Phase 2: Interviews with Stakeholders  
 
Respondents Number of Participants, Kabul  
Hope World Wide Headquarters Staff  6 
Ministry of Health Central Level Staff 5 
Ministry of Health Provincial Level 1 
Development partners 4 
INGOs 3 
NGOs (BPHS implementing partners) 4 
Total 23 
 
Phase 3: In-depth Interviews in Kapisa and Faryab  
 





Vaccinators 2 6  8 
Midwives 1 5  6 
In-Charge/NGO Program Managers 1 1  2 
CHWs 7 10  17 
Household (Male) 5 11  16 
Household (Female) 4 6  10 
HWW 1 1 3 5 
MoPH Officers /Provincial Health 
Officers 
1 2 2 5 
Total  22 42 5 69 
   
  
 
 Kabul Kapisa Faryab Total 
Total number of respondents 34 41 21 96 
 
 









021 Vaccinator CHC Kapisa 02 22  
2 022 Vaccinator CHC Kapisa 02 40  
3 023 CHW CHC Kapisa 02 37  
4 024 Vaccinator BHC Kapisa 02 36  
5 025 In Charge CHC Kapisa 02 30 
6 026 CHW BHC Kapisa 02 45  
7 027 CHW BHC Kapisa 02 33  
8 028 CHW BHC Kapisa 02 45 





10 0210 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 22 
11 0211 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 27 
12 0212 Vaccinator BHC Kapisa 02 24  
13 0213 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 32 
14 0214 CHW CHC Kapisa 02 51  
15 
0215 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 16 
16 0216 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 33 
17 
0217 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 29  
18 0218 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 37  
19 0219 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 21  
20 0220 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 21 
21 
 
0221 District Health 
Officer MoPH 
 
Kapisa 02 24 
22 
 
0222 Provincial Technical 
Advisor MoPH 
 
Kapisa 02 21 
23 0223 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 18 
24 0224 Household (male) CHC Kapisa 02 22 
25 011 Midwife CHC Kapisa 01 48  
26 
 
012 Household (female) CHC Kapisa 01 62 
27 013 CHW CHC Kapisa 01 88 
28 014 Midwife CHC Kapisa 01 42 
29 015 Midwife BHC Kapisa 01 33  
30 016 Field supervisor HWW Kapisa 01 57 
31 017 Vaccinator CHC Kapisa 01 49 
32 018 Midwife CHC Kapisa 01 33 
33 
 
019 Household (female) CHC Kapisa 01 40 
34 0110 CHW BHC Kapisa 01 28 
35 
 
0111 Household (female) BHC Kapisa 01 19 
36 0112 CHW CHC Kapisa 01 62 
37 0113 Midwife CHC Kapisa 01 13 
38 
 
0114 Health Facility Staff CHC Kapisa 01 60 
39 
 





Household (female) CHC 
 































SAF Org NGO Kabul 
01 
37 





  Supervisor 
46 0123 Programe Manager HWW Kabul 01 35 
47 0124 District Supervisor HWW Faryab 01 41 
48 0125 CHW CHC Faryab 01 78 
49 0126 CHW CHC Faryab 01 40 
50 0127 Vaccinator CHC Faryab 01 45 

































56 0133 CHW CHC Faryab 01 46 
57 0134 Household (male) CHC Faryab 01 22 
58 041 CHW CHC Faryab 04 60 
59 042 CHW CHC Faryab 04 68 
60 043 Vaccinator CHC Faryab 04 34 
61 044 Midwife CHC Faryab 04 41 
62 
 




63 046 Health Officer  CHC Faryab 04 64 
64 047 Household (male) CHC Faryab 04 40 
65 048 Household (male) CHC Faryab 04 31 
66 049 Household (male) CHC Faryab 04 25 




























Table 4.5: Health Facility Assessment – List of Health Facilities 
 Location  Study Arm Name and Type of 
Facility  
1 Hesa Awal Kohistan District,  
Kapisa Province  
Household Ashtergram, CHC 
2 Hesa Awal Kohistan District,  
Kapisa Province 
Household Serkhankhil, CHC+ 
3 Hesa Awal Kohistan District,  
Kapisa Province 
Household Sanjan, BHC 
4 Hesa Dowan Kohistan, District,  
Kapisa Province  
CHW Qazaq, CHC 
5 Hesa Dowan Kohistan, District,  
Kapisa Province  
CHW Jamal Agha, BHC 
6 Kobhand District,  
Kapisa Province  





7 Kobhand District,  
Kapisa Province  
Combined Malekar, Sub-rural health 
center 
8 Kobhand District,  
Kapisa Province  
Combined Durnama, BHC  
9 Qurghan District 
Faryab Province 





Table 4.6: Summary of Missing Data 
 
Key Variables % Missing 
Treatment of Variable in 
Final Analysis 
Dependent Variables 
Delivery <1% Excluded missing response 
DPT3 8% Excluded responses from 
Badakshan   
Treatment Variable (HH, CHW, Combined, or 
Control) 
0% N/A 
Individual and household Independent Variables 
Education 0% N/A 
Province 0% N/A 
Parity 0% N/A 
Age 0% N/A 
Perceived Security 1% Excluded missing response 
Relative Wealth 1% Excluded missing response 
Knowledge of Health Programs 1% Excluded missing response 
Distance to facility  1% Excluded missing response 
Village Variable  1% Excluded missing response 
Village   0% N/A 
 
Table 4.7: Codebook  
 
Mnemonic or  
Numeric “brief”  
code 
Full description of code When to use and when not to use 
the code.  Examples of use of the 
code to assist coders. 
 
1. Background  
 
Provides description of the interviewee and the interview setting  
1.1 Category 
 











              Other (specify) 





Mnemonic or  
Numeric “brief”  
code 
Full description of code When to use and when not to use 
the code.  Examples of use of the 
code to assist coders. 
 
 interview  
1.3 Location Where the interview took 
place 
Use this code to document if the 
interview took place at home, facility, 
office, or other  
  
 
2. Communication  Provide description of program communication  
2.1 C_Program_Start 
 
Program communication  Use this code for statements about how 




Knowledge about cash 
incentive program for 
delivery  
Use this code for statements about the 
CCT program for Delivery  
 
In the memo, note the name interviewee 
uses for the program  
2.3 C_Knowledge_DPT3 
 
Knowledge about cash 
incentive program for DPT3 
Use this code for statements about the 
CCT program for DPT3 
 
In the memo, note the name interviewee 
uses for the program 
2.3 C_Program_Start 
 
Program communication  Use this code for statements about 
how/where/when the interviewee first 
heard about the program  
2.4 C_Program End 
 
Program communication Use this code for statements about 
how/where/when interviewee heard about 
the end of the pilot  
3. Cash Transfer process  
 
 




Cash transfer process from 
both the health facility staff 
and the beneficiaries’ 
perspectives 
Use this code when statements are made 
about how cash was transferred, 
including documentation needed in order 
to receive cash  
3.2 CT_Delays** 
 
Delays in cash transfer  Use this code when statements are made 
about delays in cash transfer  
 
In the memo, note the length of time for 
the delay  
3.3 CT_Amount Amount of the cash transfer  Use this code when statements are made 
about the amount received  
 
3.4 CT_Coping** Coping mechanisms used 
when the health facility does 
not have enough cash to 
dispense 
Use this code when statements are made 
about the coping mechanisms when the 
health facility does not have enough cash 
on hand  
 
3.5 CT_Reactions** Reactions to payment delays Use this code when statements are made 
about issues (if any) caused by the cash 
delays 
4.0 Training  For health facility staff only: Use 4.0 grouping of codes to note training 





Mnemonic or  
Numeric “brief”  
code 
Full description of code When to use and when not to use 
the code.  Examples of use of the 
code to assist coders. 
 
4.1 T_CCT CCT Training provided by 
HWW  
Use this code when statements are made 
about trainings on CCT pilot project 





Training on cash 
management  
Use this code when statements are made 




Training on community 
engagement 
Use this code when statements are made 
about training to engage the community  
4.4 T_CHWs 
 
Training on CHW referral 
documentations 
Use this code when statements are made 
about CHW referral process  
5.0 Perceptions Use 5.0 grouping of codes to note stakeholder perceptions about the CCT 
project 
5.1 Perception about 
Institutional Delivery  
Institutional delivery as 
one of the 
conditionalities  
Use this code when statements are made 
about institutional delivery as one of the 
conditionalities for CCT  
5.3 Perception about 
DPT3 
DP3 as one of the 
conditionalities  
Use this code when statements are made 
about DPT3 as one of the conditionalities 
for CCT  
5.3 Perception about 
CHW 
CHW incentive  Use this code when statements are made 
about CHWs receiving cash incentives 
for completed referrals 
6.0  HH_Decision 
Making 
Use this code when statements are made about how decisions are made in 
the household regarding participation in the CCT project 
 
This could be for DPT3 or institutional delivery  
7.0 Quotes Use this code for illustrative quotes 
 
8.0 Fidelity** Use this code when field practices differ/vary from HWW policies  
9.0 Security** Use this code when statements are made about security in the area (both 
good and bad)  
 
10.0  I_Memo  Use this code to track interviewer’s reflections after each interview 
 





Chapter 5: Association of Cash Incentive and Service Utilization 
 
5.1 Individual and Household Characteristics of the Sample Population 
Table 5.1 provides description of individual and household characteristics of survey 
respondents. Despite excluding respondents from Badakhshan in the final analysis for 
DPT3 due to an extensive amount of missing data, individual and household 
characteristics for the two analyses - DPT3 and institutional delivery - are similar and 
described further below.   
 
Age of respondents: Age was analyzed as a categorical variable including the following 
groups: 15–19 years old (reference), 20–24 years old, 25–29 years old, and 30 years and 
older.  For both analyses, a majority of respondents were between the ages of 25–29 
(47.02% in institutional delivery and 45.84% in DPT3 vaccination) at the time of the 
survey.   
 
Education: Consistent with findings from nation-wide household surveys conducted 
around the same time, namely AHS 2010 and NRVA 2011, education levels among 
women remain low:  across the four study arms in both the institutional delivery and the 
DPT3 study population, approximately 8% of women reported having attended any 
school.  Women who resided in the combined arm were notably less educated:  only 3% 
of women in the combined arm in both studies reported having had any education.  In 
comparison to 8% of women the control arm, 11% in the household arm, and 12% in the 






Ethnicity: The ethnic composition of the respondents reflects the ethnic make-up of the 
study area.  A majority of respondents in Badakhshan and Faryab province are Tajiks and 
respondents from Wardak and Kapisa province are Pashtuns. Notable differences, 
however, were observed among the study arms.  
 
In the control and the CHW arm, a majority of respondents identified themselves as 
Tajiks, Pashtuns or Uzbeks, and less than 10% of the respondents identified themselves 
as Turkmen, Hazara or other. In the household arm, significantly more respondents 
identified themselves as Turkmen than in the other three arms (17%- 23% in the 
Household arm compare to less than 1% in the other three study arms).  
 
Social Economic Status: Principal component analysis (PCA) was used to develop wealth 
quintiles.  The categorization of wealth quintile was based on 15 questions on family 
ownership of durable assets and house construction. Significant differences were 
observed among study arms.  
 
In particular, for both DPT3 and institutional delivery, more respondents in the household 
arm resided in families in the top wealth quintile compare to the other three arms.   For 
institutional delivery, 43% of women in the household arm fall within in the top wealth 
quintile, compared to 15% of women in the control arm, 22% of women in the CHW 
arm, and 5% of women in the combined arm.  Similarly, in the DPT3 vaccination study, 





of women in the control arm, 23% of women in the CHW arm, and 5% of women in the 
combined arm. 
 
Distance to Facility: A major improvement in the Afghan healthcare system over the past 
decade is the availability of facilities.  A majority (80%) of the respondents reported that 
they know of a government health care facility near their homes and how to get there; 
68% lives within one hour of walk to a government facility.  Among the four intervention 
arms, respondents in the combined arm lived furthest away from a health care facility 
with 4% of respondents traveling more than one day to reach a health care facility.   
 
Utilization of health care services: A majority of respondents (62%) reported using health 
facilities between 1- 5 times over the past year and less than 10% of the respondents used 
the facility more than 10 times in the past year.  Consistent with literature, data show that 
utilization of services is positively correlated with wealth and education.  In this study, 
30% of respondents who reside in the wealthiest households reported using health facility 
more than 5 times within the past years. In comparison, only 15% of women in the 
poorest households used the facility more than 5 times in the past year.   
 
Awareness of health programs and community health workers: Three questions were 
asked to gauge women’s awareness of health programs and availability of health services 
in their district.  Questions include awareness of family planning programs, reproductive 
health programs, and community health workers.  Among the three programs, two-thirds 





programs (60%) in their community. Almost half of the respondents (48%) know at least 
one CHW working in the community. As expected, awareness of health programs is 
associated with wealth and education. Women who are in the wealthiest health quintile 
are more familiar with health programs and more likely to know at least one CHW.  
 
Perceived security:  Since, 2008 there has been a notable increase in violence across 
Afghanistan -- both among tribal groups, as well as between insurgent groups and 
government forces.  According to a United Nations report, civilian deaths due to warfare 
increased by 47% from 2009 to 2011, from 2412 deaths to 2790 deaths.  In Afghanistan, 
level of insecurity tends to vary from district to district.  While a majority of armed 
conflicts (75%, according to UN estimates) are related to anti-government insurgencies, 
in many areas, including a few CCT districts, land and resource disputes also contribute 
to on-going violence.  
 
 In this study, nearly one in five respondents reported feeling insecure about her 
environment most or all of the time.  I found significant differences among study arms 
and within provinces: one third of the women (29%) in the control arm reported feeling 
insecure most or all of the time while 10% of women in the CHW arm reported feeling 
insecure most or all the time in the institutional delivery study. Similar trends were noted 
in the DPT3 study: 37% of respondents reported feeling insecure most or all of the time, 






Looking at district level variation, an exceptionally high percentage of women reported 
not feeling safe most or all of the time in two districts in Wardak - Chat district (control 
arm) and Jarlez district (household arm).  In Chat district, 81% of respondents did not 
feel safe most or all of the time and in Jarlez, also in the Wardak province and assigned to 
the household incentive arm, 74% of respondents did not feel safe most or all of the time. 
5.2 Association between conditional cash transfer and institutional delivery  
 
Descriptive Analysis   
 
Figure 5.1 shows the percentage of women who delivered at a health facility between 
2009 and 2011 in each intervention arm district. Overall, proportion of women who 
delivered at a health facility remains low: 39% of respondents in the household arm, 32% 
of respondents in CHW arm, 12% respondents in combined arm, and 32% respondents in 
the control arm reported giving birth at a health care facility between 2009 and 2011.  
 
Column 1 of table 5.2 presents crude odds ratio for institutional delivery. The bivariate 
analysis shows that in comparison to the control arm, direct cash incentive to the 
households for institutional delivery (i.e., HH arm) is associated with higher odds of 
delivering at a health care facility (OR: 1.389, CI 1.010-1.911). However, no association 
was observed in the CHW arm (OR: 1.014, CI 0.757-1.358). Finally, women in the 
combined arm are less likely to deliver at a health facility than women in the control arm 






Additional bivariate analysis shows that uptake of services is positively associated with 
education, age, distance to facility, knowledge about health programs and wealth quintile. 
In addition, women who reported feeling secure about her environment are more likely to 
deliver at a health facility. While parity does not appear to be associated with institutional 
delivery, the variable is included in the final model as literature suggests that parity is 
associated with institutional delivery in Afghanistan. [95] 
 
At the province level, compared to Faryab (reference case), women in Wardak who 
reside in one of the pilot districts are more likely to deliver at a health facility (OR 2.458 
CI, 1.639 - 3.696), while women in Badakhshan who reside in one of the pilot districts 
are less likely to deliver at a health facility (OR: 0.192, CI: 0.118-0.311). No differences 
were observed between Kapisa and Faryab (OR: 0.977, CI: 0.656-1.455).   
 
Mixed-effects logistic regression   
 
At the individual and household levels, after controlling for covariates, a positive, 
statistically significant association was observed in the household arm compared to the 
control arm (OR: 1.526, CI 1.005 – 2.316). However, providing cash to CHWs as an 
incentive for referrals was not associated with higher odds of institutional delivery among 
women (OR: 1.043, CI 0.726 -1.498). Finally, providing cash to both households and 
CHWs appeared to have the opposite effect: women in the combined arm are less likely 






Despite the presence of a cash incentive scheme, factors associated with institutional 
delivery remain similar to findings from other studies on service utilization. [93, 94] In 
particular, uptake of institutional delivery was highest among younger women who are 
educated, live closer to a health facility, and have some knowledge of other health 
programs offered in the community.  Odds of utilization also increased with household 
wealth:  likelihood of women who reside in the wealthiest 20% of households was 58% 
higher than women who reside in the poorest households.  
 
Interestingly, this study did not find an association between perceived security and 
institutional delivery. Women who responded feeling insecure about her environment 
most or all of the time were just as likely to deliver at a health facility as women who felt 
relatively secure about her environment. While this is consistent with a study conducted 
by Sundaram in 2011 on determinants of skilled delivery, it is an interesting area for 
further research. [93] 
 
Focusing on results from the mixed-effects estimator, the standard deviation of the 
random intercept and its standard errors suggest significant variation among villages. The 
variance partition coefficient (VPC) indicates that approximately 39% of the variance in 
the outcome may be attributable to unobserved differences at the village level.  
5.3 Association between conditional cash transfer and DPT3 vaccination  
 
Figure 5.2 shows the percentage of children under the age of 2 who received the third 





findings from AMS, approximately two-thirds of children under the age of 2 reported 
receiving DPT3 vaccination in this study. In particular, 54% of respondents in the control 
arm reported children receiving DPT3 vaccination. In comparison, 69% of children in the 
household arm, 57% of children in the CHW arm, and 62% of children in the combined 
arm were reported to have received the vaccine.  
 
Descriptive Analysis   
 
Table 5.3 presents the crude odds ratio and the associated standard errors for DPT3 
vaccination. Similar to institutional delivery, findings indicate that cash incentive when 
given directly to households has a positive effect on DPT3 vaccination coverage. 
Children under 2 years of age in the household arm have higher odds of receiving the 
third dose of DPT vaccination compared to children of the same age group in the control 
arm (OR: 1.861, CI 1.387 -2.502).  Positive, but not statistically significant difference 
was observed comparing children who reside in the CHW district (OR 1.118, CI 0.853-
1.465). Finally, a positive effect was observed in the combined arm (OR: 1.379, CI 
0.983-1.935). 
 
Mixed-effects logistic regression  
 
Findings from the mixed-effects model show that the adjusted odds ratio comparing 
children under 2 years of age who reside in districts assigned to the household arm 
compared to children who reside in districts assigned to the control arm was 2.129 (CI 
1.427 – 3.451).  However, the payment to CHWs only for completed DPT3 vaccination  





in contrast with the negative association observed between cash incentive and 
institutional delivery in the combined arm, a positive association was noted for DTP3 
vaccination: adjusted odds ratio of DPT3 vaccination comparing the combined arm with 
the control arm was 1.041 (CI 0.603 -1.797).   
 
It should be noted that the negative finding for institutional delivery is not entirely 
surprising:  institutional delivery rate measured one month before the program started 
indicated that only 13% of the women in the combined arm have ever delivered at a 
health facility. This is in comparison with 43% of the women in the control arm, 34% of 
the women in the household arm, and 42% of the women in the CHW arm. 
 
Age, relative wealth of the family and distance to facility continue to have some effect on 
service utilization, however these variables do not have a consistent, and/or statistically 
significant effect on uptake of services.   
 
Findings from the random components of the mixed-level model suggest variations exist 
among villages in uptake of DPT3 vaccination. In the fully adjusted mode, approximately 
33% of the total variance in DPT3 vaccination can be attributed to unobserved 

















Observations Delivery  N= 1671  N= 1659  N=1268  N=1686 
DPT3 N=1175  N=1165  N=1169 N=1190 
Province 
Faryab  




DPT3  46% 60% 55% 51% 
Wardak  
Delivery 61% 57% 40% 18% 
DPT3  60% 68% 50% 64% 
Badakshan  
Delivery 7% 12% 13% 10% 
DPT3  -- -- -- -- 
Kapisa  
Delivery 21% 55% 39% 5% 
DPT3  57% 79% 66% 71% 
Age  
15-19 
Delivery  3% 2% 3% 4% 
DPT3 4% 2% 4% 4% 
20-24 
Delivery  18% 19% 23% 20% 
DPT3 20% 18% 23% 20% 
25-29 
Delivery  49% 50% 42% 47% 
DPT3 46% 51% 39% 50% 
30+ 
Delivery  30% 20% 32% 20% 
DPT3 30% 30% 34% 31% 
Parity  
<=4 deliveries  
Delivery 51% 56% 52% 51% 
DPT3 50% 59% 53% 51% 
> 5 deliveries  
Delivery 49% 44% 48% 49% 
DPT3 50% 41% 47% 49% 
Ever attended school 
 
Delivery  8% 11% 12% 3% 
DPT3 7% 13% 10% 3% 
Walking distance to facility  
<30 minutes  
Delivery  28% 34% 23% 15% 
DPT3 31% 42% 25% 18% 
>30 - 60 minutes 
Delivery  33% 30% 34% 29% 
DPT3 34% 36% 35% 33% 
>1 hour to1/2 day 
Delivery  27% 25% 40% 40% 





>1/2 day to 1 day 
Delivery  9% 10% 3% 12% 
DPT3 11% 4%  <1% 13% 
> 1 day 
Delivery  <1% 2% 1% 4% 
DPT3 1%   <1% 2% 4% 
Wealth Quintile  
Poorest  20% 
Delivery  28% 9% 11% 42% 
DPT3 21% 6% 14% 42% 
40% 
Delivery  20% 13% 15% 25% 
DPT3 20% 12% 15% 24% 
60% 
Delivery  21% 18% 21% 18% 
DPT3 22% 11% 19% 18% 
80% 
Delivery  15% 17% 30% 10% 
DPT3 17% 17% 29% 10% 
Wealthiest 
Delivery  15% 43% 22% 5% 
DPT3 20% 54% 23% 5% 
Ethnicity  
Pashtun 
Delivery  30% 25% 12% <1% 
DPT3 39% 33% 16% <1% 
Tajik 
Delivery  37% 41% 61% 65% 
DPT3 29% 33% 49% 54% 
Hazara 
Delivery  <1% 7% 6% 25% 
DPT3 1% 0% 8% 34% 
Uzbek 
Delivery  28% 8% 14% 9% 
DPT3 28% 10% 19% 12% 
Turkmen 
Delivery  0% 17% 1% 0% 
DPT3 0% 23% 1% 0% 
Other  
Delivery  5% 1% 5% <1% 
DPT3 2% 1% 8% 1% 
Perceived Security 
 
Insecure most of the time 
Delivery  29% 20% 10% 13% 
DPT3 37% 25% 13% 12% 
 
Secure most of the time 
Delivery  71% 80% 90% 87% 








Figure 5.1: Percentage of women who delivered at a health facility between 2009-2011, 






















































































Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model 
 
Control Arm Reference Reference 
Household Arm 
1.389**  
(1.010 - 1.911)  
1.526** 
(1.005 - 2.316)  
CHW Arm 
1.014 
 (0.757 - 1.358)  
1.043 
 (0.726 - 1.498)  
Combined Arm 
0.258*** 
(0.203 - 0.401)  
0.126*** 
(0.076 - 0.207)  
 
Parity 









Ever attended school vs. 




(1.369 - 2.522)  
Perceived security Secure 
vs. insecure 
 1.003 












Odds Ratio  
Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model 
















 (0.158 - 0.856)  
  











>30 – 60 min  
1.050 
 (0.783 - 1.409)  
 
>60 – 2 hours  
0.677*** 
(0.506 - 0.907)  
 
>2 hours  - ½ day  
0.814 
(0.442 - 1.502) 
> ½ day  
2.039* 
 (0.916 - 4.536)  







Odds Ratio  
Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model  
Knowledge of Health Programs  
 
No knowledge of health programs 
Reference 
Know of 1 health program  
1.327 
(0.860 - 2.048)  
Know of 2 health programs   
2.155*** 
 (1.392 - 3.337)  
Know of 3+ health programs   
3.738*** 









(1.639 - 3.686) 
Badakshan  
0.192*** 
 (0.118 - 0.311) 
Kapisa  
0.977 









(0.667 - 1.314)  
60%  
1.069 
(0.758 - 1.508)  
80%  
1.376* 
(0.976 - 1.939) 
Wealthiest 20%  
1.580** 












Odds Ratio  
Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model  
   
Random effects    
Village level variance   2.124 
 (1.673-2.697) 
   
Village level VPC (%) 
 
 39% 
Robust CI in parentheses 










Figure 5.2: Percentage of children under 2 years of age who received DPT3 vaccination 




























































































Odds Ratio  
Column 2 
Adjusted Odds Ratio 
  Mixed-Effects Model 
Control Arm Reference Reference 
Household Arm 
1.863*** 
 (1.387 - 2.502) 
2.219*** 
(1.427 - 3.451)  
CHW Arm 
1.118 
(0.853 - 1.465)  
1.299 
(0.830 - 2.031) 
Combined Arm 
1.379* 
(0.983 - 1.935) 
1.041 









(0.648 - 1.100) 
 
Education    











Secure vs. insecure 
 0.762 












Odds Ratio  
Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model  
Age Groups   
15-19  Reference 
20-24  
1.040 
(0.424 - 2.549)  
25-29 
 1.101 
(0.451 - 2.689)  
30+ 
  1.342 
(0.501 - 3.594)  
Distance from facility 
 
  
<30 min  Reference 
>30 – 60 min   
1.244 
(0.864 - 1.790)  
 
>60 – 2 hours   
0.579*** 
 (0.391 - 0.855)  
>2 hours  - ½ day   
 
0.849 
(0.440 - 1.639)  
> ½ day   
         
0.827 









Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model  
Knowledge of Health Programs   




Know of 1 health program  
 
2.088** 
(1.157 - 3.766)  
 
Know of 2 health programs  
 
2.133*** 
(1.391 - 3.271)  
   
Know of 3+ health programs 3.394*** 

























(0.643 - 1.291)  
60%  
1.234 




(0.661 - 1.436)  
Wealthiest 20%  
0.711* 












Odds Ratio  
 
Adjusted Odds Ratio 
Mixed-Effects Model 
   
Random effects    
Village level variance (SE)     1.636 
(1.260- 2.125) 
   




Robust CI in parentheses 









Chapter 6: Program Implementation  
 
This chapter uses a variety of data sources to (1) describe how the Afghanistan program 
was implemented, (2) explore stakeholders’ perspectives on CCT program design, and 
(3) assess contextual and implementation factors in two provinces  - Kapisa and Faryab.  
To date, most CCT studies utilize quantitative methods to evaluate effectiveness of the 
intervention; few studies explore program implementation. However, conditional cash 
transfer is a complex and resource intensive program to implement. This study adds to 
the limited literature and knowledge about CCT program implementation and aims to 
provide policy makers in Afghanistan information on implementation challenges and 
strategies. This chapter is organized as follows:  
 Description of the study sites 
 Description of central level implementation  
 Results on program design: feasibility of implementing the project in the selected 
districts in Afghanistan, and acceptability of the CCT pilot project among 
stakeholders 
 Results on program implementation at the central and district levels: technical 
capacity of the implementing partner, and variations in approaches to program 
communication and distribution of cash incentives  
6.1 Description of study sites 
As discussed in Chapter 4, a variety of sources were used to better understand the 





household survey and interviews and program reports collected at the central level 
(MoPH and HWW Headquarters). In addition, I used data collected from in-depth 
interviews and rapid assessment of supply-side readiness in two of the four pilot 
provinces: Faryab and Kapisa.  
 
Selection of Field Sites: Kapisa and Faryab  
The study team purposely selected Faryab and Kapisa to conduct in-depth interviews 
with households, CHWs, field implementers, and health facility assessments for three 
main reasons: (1) geographic diversity; (2) contextual variations; and (3) safety of the 
field team.  
 
Geography 
Kapisa is located in the center of the country, 800 km from Kabul, while Faryab is 
located in the northwest part of the country bordering Turkmenistan. Both provinces are 
rural and poor: according to 2008 Ministry data, more than 90% of the population in 
Kapisa live in rural areas, 30% of the population are literate, 18% have access to clean 
drinking water, and 38% have access to electricity. Similarly, in Faryab, 89% of the 
population live in rural areas, 22% of the population are literate, 24% of the households 
have access to drinking water, and 32% have access to electricity.[10] 
 
Health Service Delivery 
Between 2009-2011, health services in Kapisa were managed under a “contracting-in” 





provision in Faryab was “contracted-out” to four NGOs: Solidarity of Afghan Families 
(SAF), Agency for Assistance and Development of Afghanistan (AADA), Care of 
Afghan Families (CAF), and Coordination for Humanitarian Assistance.  Financing was 
provided by USAID and contracts were managed by MoPH.  
 
Irrespective of contractual arrangements, according to the 2008 Balanced Scorecard 
report, health services and overall facility management in these provinces were deemed 
to be above the national average. The Balanced Scorecard is a performance management 
tool that has been in use since 2004 to measure and manage performance of health 
facilities. The scorecard uses 29 indicators to measure performance across the following 
domains: staff, service provision, financial systems, patients and community, and 
MoPH’s overall vision and capacity for service provision. Scores are benchmarked to 
national average and tracked on a yearly basis. According to the 2008 report, the 
composite scores for Faryab and Kapisa are 78.2 and 78.8, respectively, both of which 
fall above the national upper benchmark of 54.9. Compared to previous years, health 
facilities in both provinces showed steady improvements over time, particularly in the 
service provision domains. [99]  
 
Security and Logistics 
 
At the time of the study, Badakhshan and Wardak were particularly difficult for 
researchers to access due to severe weather and insecurity. In Badakshan, roads to pilot 
districts were closed due to heavy and prolonged winter storms. After numerous delays, 






In Wardak, security was the main concern. By 2010, many parts of Wardak were 
controlled by the Taliban. The Ministry explored training local data collectors (i.e., 
researchers from Wardak) in Kabul. The study team would conduct quality assurance 
remotely, through conference calls. However, after several discussions, it was decided 
that this approach would not ensure data quality.  
 
6.2 Description of the implementation process  
 
Program Launch and Stakeholder Communication 
In November 2008, HWW was awarded the contract. Shortly after the program was 
launched, HWW held a stakeholder meeting and presented the design and overall 
objectives of the pilot study. Participants of the meeting included MoPH staff, provincial 
health directors (PHDs) from Badakhshan, Kapisa, Ghore
5
, and Faryab; representatives 
of NGOs providing services in the pilot districts; and other stakeholders, including the 
World Bank, the European Union, USAID, and GAVI.   
 
In interviews with HWW staff, several emphasized the importance of the initial meeting. 
One senior member of the HWW team said:   
“We need to get their buy-in. We took a lot of time to explain the objectives of the 
project to ensure that we have their buy-ins.” 
 
   - HWW Headquarter Staff, Kabul (Discussion 1) 
 
                                                 
5
 Ghore was included in the initial design of the CCT pilot sites. After an assessment, the province was 





However, for the remaining period of the pilot, no additional meetings were held at the 
central level. It should be noted that PHDs received updates on the CCT project from 
HEFD staff as part of on-going meeting discussions on MNCH and Community Health 
programs; HWW did not participate in these meetings. 
 
Inception Phase 
Following the stakeholder meeting, HWW conducted site visits to the provinces selected 
by the Ministry: Badakshan, Kapisa, Ghore, Faryab. The purpose of the visits was to 
validate the selection of the study sites and to select the study districts. After the site 
visits, HWW determined that Ghore province was not suitable for the CCT pilot due to an 
insufficient number of midwives. The Ministry replaced Ghore with Wardak province.  
 
Field offices were set up in each Province. In Badakhshan and Faryab HWW rented 
offices, and in Kapisa and Wardak the offices were located in BPHS facilities. Each field 
office was staffed with one provincial supervisor who was responsible for overseeing 
implementation of the pilot project at all districts, and three field officers (one per 
intervention district) who were responsible for training health facility staff on the project, 
ensuring cash is available, conducting outreach and communication campaigns about the 
pilot project, and coordinating program monitoring visits at the designated intervention 
districts.  
 
Between 2009 and 2011, four capacity building workshops for the HWW field staff were 





and evaluation, and data collection for baseline and endline surveys. Additional 
workshops were held in the pilot provinces; these trainings were not documented.  
 
Financial Management and Incentive Payment Process 
The success of CCT to influence behavior hinges on timely delivery of cash incentives to 
recipients. According to the HWW final report, a number of processes were put in place 
to ensure that ample cash was available at the health facility. The following excerpt 
outlines the fund management, transfer, and payment process[100]:  
 
Funds transfer process to the provincial offices:  
Each province had a separate bank account in the Kabul Bank so that the 
provincial supervisors could securely obtain the money needed for the program. 
On a regular basis as and when needed the Kabul office Finance Manager would 
transfer funds to provincial office bank accounts based on the cash request 
submitted by the provincial supervisor. The provincial supervisor would withdraw 
the cash from the bank via checks, which were signed by all the appropriate 
people. These funds were then used for basic operating expenses and distribute 
[sic.] to the BPHS facilitators, CHWs, and staff on a monthly basis.  
 
Cash deposit with BPHS facilitators:  
In secure areas where transportation was readily available, cash advances were 
given to the BPHS facilitator every 15 days. In areas where transportation was 
not readily available, cash advance [sic.] were given to the BPHS facilitator on a 
monthly basis. Each time a cash advance was given, the previous advance was 
cleared by the BPHS facilitator submitting the corresponding incentive payment 
vouchers that were distributed. The field officers collect these incentive vouchers 
on a regular basis and submitted them to the provincial supervisor. On some 
occasions the provincial supervisor would collect the vouchers himself if he was 
conducting a M&E visit.  
 
Incentive cash payment to CHWs: 
The incentive cash payment to the CHWs was paid based on the number of 
referrals successfully made. These incentives were paid when the referral 
submission form was submitted by the CHWs and these forms were cross checked 
with BPHS facility records. These incentives were paid to the CHWs by the field 
officers on a weekly, bi-weekly, or monthly basis depending on the number of 
referrals submitted in any given period.  





-- HWW Final Report, 2011 
   
During field visits in Kapisa and Faryab, the team asked if guidelines were in place 
regarding who should manage the cash at the health facility and the process for recipients 
to collect the cash. Based on interviews with HWW and health facility staff, there appears 
to be no standardized arrangement of how to manage cash at the facility level, and few 
were aware of HWW’s policies.  
 
Public Awareness Activities  
HWW relied mostly on print materials such as posters placed at the health facilities and 
leaflets given at community events. In addition to print materials, meetings were held 
with district health shuras (groups of community elders), Community Development 
Council (CDC) members, and mullahs (local religious leaders). However, from the 
technical reports, objectives of these meetings are not clear.  
 
Monitoring and Evaluation   
 
Monitoring Process  
Monitoring visits—from HWW headquarters staff to provincial offices, and from field 
officers to health facilities and the community—occurred on a quarterly basis. Upon the 
Ministry’s request, HWW adapted the National Monitoring Checklist and used it to guide 
the monitoring visits. 
 
HWW field staff also conducted community audits to verify that incentives were indeed 





3 cash recipients from the CCT program registry, and conduct household and/or CHW 
verification. Since recordkeeping was poor and addresses were not available in most 
districts, a community member (typically a CHW or vaccinator) who was familiar with 
the community would accompany the visit. Verbal and visual verification of the child 
was used for institutional delivery. For DPT3, verification protocol required that the 
HWW staff review the vaccination card. However, this was difficult to implement as few 
households could maintain vaccination card(s). In most instances, staff relied on verbal 
verification for DPT3 vaccination.  
 
Finally, focus groups with CHWs and households were conducted every six months. The 
purpose of the focus groups was to assess how well the program was functioning and to 
see if there were areas where the program may improve. CHWs and household members 
who received the incentive were invited to the focus group discussions. These discussions 
were lead by HWW field officers and key findings were noted in the technical narrative 
report submitted to the Ministry on a quarterly basis. 
 
6.3 Results of Program Design: Acceptability and Feasibility  
Acceptability   
 
Most stakeholders - household members, CHWs, health facility staff, community leaders, 
and government officials - were positive about the program and encouraged the Ministry 
to consider using this modality to encourage service utilization. However, the most 
common reason cited for support of the program was financial benefits to the households 





incurred during seeking care. They include: food and lodging, transportation, medicine, 
and ancillary costs. For CHWs, many indicated that the money made them feel 
appreciated and compensated for some expenses. Similar sentiments were expressed by 
health facility staff who were not compensated under the CCT scheme. Most welcomed 
the concept of using cash incentive to increase service utilization.   
“Yes, it had good impacts. The vaccination patients were less before but then 
when the community health workers went to the villages and told people about 
everything and they received awareness, they were coming more to the clinic. 
They also know more about why they need to come get the shots. I think this 
makes my job easier.” 
 - Vaccinator, Kapisa (Discussion 021) 
 
 
“Allah is Great. He knows that I am poor, I don't have money. In my opinion, as 
my life condition is not good, I am very happy from the clinic for giving me 
money. That one hundred and fifty has helped me a lot, I have spent it on many 
things. I am very happy from the doctors in the clinic. I am happy from you too.”  
- Woman, Faryab (Discussion 019) 
 
“In my opinion, the incentive money was good. I like what I do but I am poor. 
150 Afs allows me to buy some food and fuel. I can use the money to go to more 
houses.”  
 - CHW, Kapisa  (Discussion 028) 
 
Nevertheless, few interviewees disagreed with the use of conditional cash transfer to 
improve utilization of health services. One program manager from the Provincial Health 
Department in Kapisa suggested that a better use of the money would be to improve 
health facilities. According to his assessment, the investment should be put towards 
improving maternity wards, buying more ambulances, and building sleeping quarters for 
midwives so that they could stay overnight. A CHW working in the district assigned to 
the combined arm in Kapisa commented that the incentive scheme negatively impacted 





them there is money when there is not.”  Finally a few household members suggested that 
the money should be given the households without conditionality.  
 
The interviewers further probed on acceptability of specific conditionalities: institutional 
delivery and DPT3 vaccination.  Most interviewees were knowledgeable about, and 
welcomed, cash incentive for DPT3 vaccination. Fewer respondents were aware of the 
institutional delivery incentive. And among those who were aware, some did not think 
the conditionality was appropriate.  
“No. I know there is money, but I cannot use the clinic. The clinic is for people 
who are very sick. If I don't have any problem at home, why should I go to the 
clinic? At most the delivery will last two hours or three hours. My brother in-law's 
wife is here to help me. My mother and my sisters don't come here because they 
have had argument with my husband.” 
- Woman, Faryab (Discussion 019) 
 
  
Feasibility – Supply Side readiness 
 
To assess the feasibility of the study design, we focused on supply-side readiness and 
asked the following question: Did the health facilities have the capacity to provide 
institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccinations? To answer this question, we conducted 
rapid assessments at nine participating health facilities using an abridged and adapted 
version of the health facility form for the Balanced Scorecard. [92]  
 
Tables 6.1 and 6.2 provide a summary of supply-side indicators based on the rapid 
assessment  
 





Of the nine health facilities visited by the research team, seven had at least one midwife 
on staff at the time of the assessment. Two health facilities (Sanjan and Durnama, both 
BHCs in Kapisa) reported having one male nurse and one male physician on staff, and no 
female staff.   
 
Institutional Delivery  - Basic Infrastructure and Opening Hours  
 
With the exception of one health facility (Durnama in Kapisa), all health facilities and 
one sub-rural health facility had at least a maternity bed or delivery table. However, only 
four health facilities had both running water and electricity during the assessment visit, 
and all health facilities had limited opening hours; all health facilities (including a CHC+ 
facility) reported being open from 8:30 a.m. to 3:30 p.m. in the winter, and from 8:30 to 
4:00 p.m. during the summer months.   
One PHD from Kapisa commented:  
“I don’t see a change with this program. A mother comes from a very far place to 
a clinic where they work from 8:00 to 3:30 in the afternoon. There is not a waiting 
room in at the clinic and the [woman] whose delivery will be very soon, she may 
have to come back soon. She may have [to come back in] one day, two days or 
three days. The midwife tells her to go home and come tomorrow.  
 
What we want is a room for the woman to stay in. We do not want the money for 
delivery”  
 
- PHD, Kapisa (Discussion 032) 
 
 
Institutional Delivery - Emergency Referrals  
 
The Ministry of Health has designated four types of facilities to provide emergency 
obstetric and neonatal care (EmONC). They include district hospitals (DHs), provincial 





areas where DHs or PHs are not available, CHC+ are equipped to manage obstetric 
complications. In theory, all BHCs and CHCs are equipped with vehicle(s) to provide 
transportation for patients to the referral facilities (either a hospital or CHC+) However, 
in practice, not all health facilities have a functional vehicle, and/or fuel to provide the 
emergency transfer. In our assessment, less than half the health facilities (4 out of 9) had 
both a vehicle and fuel on the day of the assessment.  
 
These supply-side limitations have an affect on program implementation. Indeed, this 
was a concern most frequently raised by interviewees.  
 
 One maternal health officer at the Kapisa provincial health office commented:  
 
“From the start, I was not sure the delivery component will work. Look, we are in 
a very mountainous area.  We do not have electricity or gas to keep the lights on 
in the evening, and in many places we do not have water. Also, look around— we 
do not have a place for people to stay. Where are the midwives going to sleep if 
they stay overnight? Where are the families going to stay?  The best thing to do is 
to take the incentive money and improve the health facilities. I am not against 
giving family money. But first, we have to fix the health facilities”  
 
- Maternal Health Officer, PHD, Kapisa (Discussion 0221) 
 Another in-charge officer in Faryab said:  
“We do not talk about institutional delivery and do not encourage it. We did not 
had a midwife for more than a year, we do not want a woman to show up at our 
facility when we cannot deliver the baby.”  
 
- Health Facility Staff, Faryab (Discussion 046) 
 
DPT3 Vaccination - Human Resources  
Compared to institutional delivery, DPT3 vaccination is less resource intensive. A larger 





injections. During the assessment, the team found that eight of the nine health facilities 
reported having a vaccinator in the clinic; Malekar, a sub-rural health center in Kapisa, 
was the only health facility that reported not having a vaccinator on staff.  
 
DPT3 Vaccination - Basic Infrastructure 
Similarly, infrastructure and vaccines appear to be in place; most health facilities (8 
facilities) had a solar-powered vaccine refrigerator and sharps disposal canisters (7 
facilities). We did not access the functionality of the refrigerator or the temperature. In 
later discussions with MoPH staff, this was raised as a challenge.  
 
DPT3 Vaccination - Availability of DPT Vaccine  
 
While this was not assessed during the health facility visits, inconsistent supply of 
vaccines was mentioned and appeared to be a more common issue.  
“We do not always have the vaccine. That is true. For families that live nearby, 
this is not a big problem. Many just come back. We were giving them incentive 
money so this is not a problem. They come back. Some families live very far.”  
 - Vaccinator, Faryab (Discussion 024) 
“There were no medicine for us now. I don’t have medicine for eight months ago. 
This is a great problem for DPT3 and for delivery”  
 - CHW, Kapisa (Discussion 0112) 
 
DPT3 Vaccination - EPI Registry 
A more common difficulty identified by the vaccinators was the lack of ability to verify 
that the patient has received the first two doses of DPT vaccine. Most health facilities 
have a poorly maintained EPI registry and most households do not have a vaccine card.  
Given the difficulty in verification, in most instances incentives were given to households 





“We don’t have a good way to keep track of everyone. I ask them and they tell 
me. That’s how we find out. Maybe some people come back for more than 3 
shots, and maybe some people are getting their first shot.  We also have some 
people who go to other clinics for the first 2 shots, then come here for the 3
rd
 one 
for vaccine money.  We all think this is a good program so we do not want to 
make lives hard for people. You know people are poor here.  We give the shot and 
we tell the supervisor to pay.”  
- Vaccinator, Kapisa (Discussion 024) 
 
 
Community Health Workers (CHWs) 
 
One arm of the cash incentive aims to motivate CHWs to complete referrals. As such, 
availability of CHWs in the pilot districts is important for program implementation. We 
inquired about availability of CHWs at districts assigned to the CHW and the combined 
incentive arm. We found that a majority of the health facilities had at least one CHW 
associated with the health facility; Malekar, a sub-rural center in the Kobhand District of 
Kapisa Province, did not have community health workers. 
 
In places that did not have CHWs (or a sufficient number of CHWs) to provide services 
to the community, interviewees noted that communities were able to recruit CHWs as a 
result of the incentive program. This was confirmed by HWW’s quarterly report.  
According to the July-September 2009 report, health facility in Karan-a-Munjan, a 
remote district in Badakshan Province, successfully recruited a CHW as a result of the 
CCT project:  
 
“Some villages do not have CHWs, therefore, the community has proposed to 
introduce a representative to work as a CHW and refer the potential beneficiaries 
to the BHC. After the MoPH approval for the community representatives to work 
as CHWs, and to refer the beneficiaries to BHCs, they have been paid incentives 
for 15 referrals which had been pending in July.”  







6.4 Results on program implementation  
Technical and Managerial Capacity of the Implementing Partner 
The implementing partner (IP) is responsible for designing and executing the 
implementation strategy, coordinating activities with other projects related to health, 
supporting health facility staff in implementing the program, and monitoring progress. 
The technical capacity of the IP to carry out the activities has a direct effect on program 
outcomes. For many CCT projects, the implementer is the government. In Afghanistan, 
an international NGO based in Kabul – Hope World Wide (HWW) was selected to 
implement and evaluate the project.  
 
Capacity of HWW 
The general perception among the HEFD team was that HWW had limited technical and 
overall managerial capacity to implement the CCT project. In particular, staff noted the 
organization’s lack of experience implementing demand side financing programs and 
minimal experience in rigorous program evaluation were one of the main reasons that the 
program did not succeed.  
 
Issues surfaced within a few months after the grant was awarded in 2008. Documented 
communication between the Ministry and HWW indicated that the Ministry was 
concerned about many aspects of the project. According to the July-September 2009 
quarterly report, HWW received a warning from the Ministry that project start-up was not 
progressing as expected and funding would be withheld until concrete actions were taken. 





bank accounts in provinces, and mistakes in the HWW financial invoices submitted to the 
Ministry (July – September 2009) 
One MoPH staff commented:  
“We had a difficult time with the project at the beginning. We were not too happy 
for many reasons. They did not have the right people for this project. We had to 
provide them with many guidelines and sometimes do things for them.”   
-  MoPH Staff, Kabul (Discussion 2) 
 
His colleague echoed:  
 
“In the end, too many things went wrong. We did not have a good baseline survey 
and had so many delays for the mid-term survey that we decided to cancel. This is 
a good program. Really is…. It can help many people in Afghanistan. But too 
many problems.”  
- MoPH Manager, Kabul (Discussion 2) 
 
The relationship between HWW and the Ministry remained contentious throughout the 
project, which at times impacted program implementation.  
 
 Financial and Communication: Variations in program implementation   
 
Drawing on data from HWW quarterly reports and in-depth interviews in Kapisa and 
Faryab, this section provides findings on implementation approaches in the field. In 
particular, this section highlights variations in implementation approaches, as many 
processes were not well defined by HWW. It should be noted that both positive and 
negative deviations occurred; we noted innovative approaches that allowed the program 
to be delivered more effectively and efficiently, as well as practices that contributed to 
further delays in payments and miscommunications about the project. In particular, we 
focused on two areas where we observed diverse implementation strategies: program 







Womens’ awareness of the cash incentive program is a key indication of the reach of the 
program and a proxy for how well the program was implemented. HWW developed a 
communications plan that focused on informing the stakeholders about the pilot program 
through print materials. Banners and leaflets were placed at health facilities and 
community centers. In addition, HWW field staff met with community leaders, CHWs, 
and households to inform them about the purpose of the project and to gather feedback on 
program implementation. Due to the high cost of travel and the difficulty in reaching 
some of the villages, in-person interactions were less frequent.   
 
According to the endline household survey, most households were aware of the program. 
Nearly 80% of women surveyed in the household arm reported having heard of the cash 
incentive program for delivery, and 85% of women in the combined arm had heard of the 
cash incentive program. In the CHW and control arms, there was no communication 
about the program to the household since incentives were not given. As expected, less 
than 1% of respondents were aware of cash incentive programs in the CHW arm and only 
two people reported having heard of the cash incentive program in the control arm. 
 
However, most households did not find out about the program through communication 
materials provided by HWW. According to the endline survey, friends and family were 
the main source of information. In Kapisa and Faryab, nearly 80% reported having heard 
about the program through family and friends, and 68% reported hearing about the 





learned about the program through CHWs, and even fewer heard of the program through 
mullahs and community councils. 
 
Through interviews, we further explored the various communication approaches that 
HWW field officers and health facility staff used to inform households about the 
program.  In line with findings from the household survey, various informal channels 
were used to promote the incentive program. A common approach was for health facility 
staff to ask women who received cash incentives to tell her friends and families. This was 
done through both informal and formal arrangements.  
One health facility staff in Kapisa stated:  
“We have posters at the health facility. You can see it.  But we read it for them. 
Then I tell the woman to tell all her friends. I tell her husband too. I tell him to tell 
all his friends.”   
- Health Facility Staff, Kapisa (Discussion 022) 
 
Another CHW described:  
“As I told you before that CHW were calling them out by loud speakers to come 
in the mosque. One day ahead the Community Health Supervisor (CHS) was 
calling CHW about vaccine to collect the women in the mosques or in the house 
of CHW not only vaccine of children but if they are pregnant they also to come 
for vaccine.”  
- Midwife, Kapisa (Discussion 0113) 
 
Various names were given to the program: For instance in Kobhan, the incentive scheme 
was referred to as the “vaccination money”. Other names included “sanitation money”, 
“government money”, “injection cash”,” and “health money”.  
 





One consistent theme observed during field visits was a lack of communication about 
when the incentive program would end. In several of communities visited, there were no 
apparent efforts by HWW to let households, health facility staff, and community 
members know that the pilot project had ended.  Four months after the pilot ended, one 
vaccinator at a clinic in Faryab said: “There is some delay, but money will come. I tell 
the women to check back.” (Vaccinator, Faryab Discussion 0126)   
 
In Kobhan, a district in Kapisa that provided incentives to both CHWs and households, 
health facility staff gave out “promise notes” in lieu of cash when the pilot program 
ended. During one site visit to Kobhan that I joined, the field team’s car was surrounded 
by villagers waving such promise notes and seeking compensation from the Ministry staff 
who accompanied the field team. Members of the community were visibly upset; the 
CHW who accompanied the team on the site visit explained: 
“Everyone is confused about the program. We are not sure why it ended. At fist, 
[sic.] we thought it was because money was not there. So like before when we did 
not have money right away, we hand out these vaccine promise notes. We tell 
them that we’ll let them know as soon as the money is here and they can come 
and collect. So that is how the promise notes happened. Now they are very upset 
with us. You can see how upset they are. Please try to bring the program back” 
- CHW, Kapisa (Discussion 026) 
 
A female CHW added:  
“Ten women were coming to my house daily for refers. [sic.] I explain for them 
that this program is finished and will start again. They were saying that you were 
not giving us the referral money, you misuse the money. I was telling them that 
this money was from higher level of government and now they stopped this 
program by the ministry of public health. I tell them to be hopeful for restarting 
program.”  






Even among clinics that communicated with families regarding the end of the program, 
issues remained. One CHW at the Hesse-Awal District in Kapisa Province explained:  
“Before the project ended, we had a midwife, people were coming to the clinic for 
deliveries, and patients for receiving [DPT3] vaccination were also referring to 
the clinic. Now we are in trouble with that program, people don’t come or if they 
come they always argue with us to give money. We were giving one hundred and 
fifty Afghanis for DPT3 vaccinations. We tell people project has ended and there 
is no cash. Many people do not believe us.”  
- CHW, Kapisa  (Discussion 028) 
 
Cash Management and Incentive Payment 
Cash Management 
Cash management is a new concept to most of the participating health facilities. Prior to 
the CCT program, most health facility managers or in-charge officers do not maintain a 
cash registry as all operational costs were paid for by the contracted NGO.   During field 
visits, the team observed limited capacity at health facilities to manage cash flow and 
wide variations in cash management practices. In most facilities, the in-charge officer 
assumes the responsibility of providing cash to the households and CHWs, and 
maintained a ledger that documents disbursement, including records of the names and 
addresses of the beneficiaries. In a few facilities, the vaccinator was responsible for cash 
disbursement and in one facility, the responsibility was split between the vaccinator and a 
senior medical officer; the vaccinator provided cash incentives to households, while the 






Regardless of who is responsible for managing and disbursing cash, a consistent theme 
that emerged was limited capacity among facility staff to manage cash flow, and a lack of 
hands-on training and assistance provided by HWW.  
 
 One staff member explained: 
“I do not think we received enough training about what to do [with cash 
incentive]… HWW gave us a form to keep track of the people who received the 
money, but we had to come up with our way to make sure that money we have in 
the cash box matches the amount paid, otherwise we get in trouble.  This took a 
lot of time….”   
 
“Training is not enough. They need to show us at the clinic how to do things. 
Because every time we get something wrong, they delay in giving us the money.”  
 
   - Health Facility Staff, Kapisa (Discussion 018) 
 
 
Another staff member explained 
 
“No, there was no one to whom I had complained to or ask more questions. For 
example the one who trained us in the workshop for 2 days…went back…” 
   - CHW, Kapisa (Discussion 0114) 
 
In another clinic, a midwife said:  
 
“One month we do it one way, and another month we do it another way. 
Sometimes the problem is that we do not have any vaccine money.”  
    - Health Facility Staff, Kapisa (Discussion 0212) 
This lack of capacity to manage cash flow at the health facility was a source of stress for 
some health facility staff. One in-charge officer at the health facility commented: 
“I was away for one month because my family was sick. Then I found out that no 
money was given while I was away.  The money was there and they have the key 
to the [cash] box, but no one was sure how to do things and they were afraid to do 
it wrong. They told the family to come back. Some families got very angry and 
said that we lied to them.”  





The fear of mishandling cash led some health facilities to take conservative measures, 
such as requiring double-signature upon receipt of the cash, limiting cash disbursements 
to the assigned staff (even when the staff is on leave), and extensive verification for 
CHW referrals. Many of the measures put in place contributed to further delays in cash 
disbursement and may not be necessary if proper support was provided by HWW.  
 
Incentive Amount 
Among households that received cash incentives for either DPT3 vaccination or delivery, 
a majority (95%) reported receiving the full amount: 150 AFN for DPT3 and 300 AFN 
for delivery for households. This was observed in findings from the household survey  
and verified with data collected through in-depth interviews. Of the respondents who 
reported having received a different amount, the range reported was between 80 AFN and 
200 AFN for DPT3, and 20 AFN to 400 AFN for institutional delivery. There were no 
discernible patterns by district or household characteristics among individuals who 
reported receiving more or less than the official incentive amount.  
 
The team did not conduct a survey among the CHWs. Instead, questions about payment 
amount and frequency were explored during in-depth interviews in Kapisa and Faryab. 
Of the CHWs interviewed, all reported receiving 150 AFN per DPT3 referral, and the 
majority reported receiving 150 AFN for institutional delivery referrals. However, two 








Administration of the cash varied in terms of the process and when cash was received. 
According to program protocol, CHWs receive payments on a bi-weekly basis, and 
households receive cash upon service utilization.  
 
In practice, cash payments for households and CHWs were often delayed. Delays in 
payments for households ranged from two to three days to more than six months. Delays 
also occurred regularly for CHWs; according to interviews with CHWs, many said that 
payments were ad hoc and depended on when the health facility received cash 
replenishment.  
 
Despite the delays in payment, some women did not see this as a major problem and 
accepted the delays as the normal course of business. One woman in Faryab mentioned:  
“It is not good, but it is ok. Doctor gave me the money maybe some time later. I 
have to go for 2 children vaccine money later. Things are not always there at the 
clinic, so I have to go back.”  
- HH, Faryab (Discussion 0131) 
 
Others saw this as a breach of trust: “If you do not have money, do not make a promise.” 
– HH, Kapisa (Discussion 0116). When probed whether not receiving timely payments to 
cover travel and other associated costs caused any financial problems, the response was 
mixed. Some reported that the payment delays led to high out-of-pocket expenditures, 
while others said that delays in payment were an inconvenience but did not affect overall 





lived close to a health facility; we were not able to explore the impact of payment delays 
on women in the rural areas.  
 
CHWs interviewed expressed more frustration with the payment system. Their main 
complaints include (1) delays and unpredictability of the payment schedule, and (2) not 
receiving payments for all their referrals. The former was linked to ongoing problems 
with transferring cash to the health facilities. The latter was, in part, due to the fact that 
HWW stipulates that payments need to be based on completed referral slips.  If a 
household member forgets to bring the referral slip or lost the slip, the CHW would not 
get paid.  To mediate the issue, the in-charge officer in one facility relaxed the rule; 
payments were made to CHWs based on CHW records, and/or if the patient mentioned 
by name the CHW who made the referral.  
Due to these payment issues, the relationship between the CHWs and health facility staff 
was contentious at times.  
One CHW in Kapisa said:  
“The doctors who were from our clinic misused the money and no others who are 
in high ranking positions. For the first time when I got familiar with doctors there 
was a doctor by the name of x and one another as well, he said whenever you 
have any problem you can tell me I didn’t have his number when he was coming 
after two months he was meeting with other doctors I couldn’t talk with him 
separately there was no opportunity for me to talk with him, I had seventeen 
refers but at the end of month when I was asked about refers I told the doctors I 
have seventeen refers because there was the name of the referrers as well I had 
their names in my list but they were giving me only four refers money. When I 
asked them what about others they were saying that the women didn’t bring their 
refer letters.”  
- CHW, Kapisa (Discussion 029) 
 





Given the widespread discontent regarding delays in payment, particularly among CHWs, 
we attempted to trace the reasons for delays in cash disbursement from the facility to the 
HWW field office to HWW headquarters to better understand the bottlenecks.  
 
At the facility level, the most common reason cited for delays in payment was inadequate 
funds. According to interviews with health facility staff, monthly replenishment often 
arrived 2 to 3 weeks late.  One vaccinator said:   
“Money should be given to the family right after I give the shot. Sometimes we 
cannot do this because we did not receive the money that month…. When I know 
that we do not have the money in the health facility, I tell the mother first so she 
does not get mad. I still tell her it is good for the baby to get the shot”  
- Vaccinator, Kapisa (Discussion 017) 
 
Another reason for delays in disbursement is the absence of the in-charge officer or 
authorized staff to give cash. In most health facilities visited, only one person, typically 
the in-charge officer or the head vaccinator was allowed to disburse cash. In some 
facilities, the person responsible for cash disbursement would bring the cash box home at 
the end of the day, and in other facilities the cash envelope would be kept in a locked 
drawer at the health facility.  
 
At the HWW field office level, field and headquarters staff said that delays were due to 
two reasons: incomplete or delayed cash request forms from the health facilities, and 
lengthy bank procedures to transfer the funds from the central to the provincial level.  
 
One HWW field officer noted:  
 
“For example, we do not get all the referral sheets. CHWs give us the sheets, and 
the health facilities give us the sheets. They are not the same, and we have to 






“And for the family, we do not know where the money goes.  I cannot give them 
[health facilty] more money if I do not see the name and address of the people 
[who received the incentive] from last month.”  
 
 - HWW, Kabul (Discussion 2) 
Strategies to address payment delays  
At the facility level, several strategies were used to manage payment delays. The most 
common strategy was to ask the recipient (woman or CHW) to return to the health 
facility when cash is available. In one clinic in Kobhan, health facility staff gave out 
promise vaccine notes, and in other clinics, the health facility staff made a note in the 
ledger of the amount owed.  
 
In one instance, a health facility staff provided money out of her pocket. She explained:  
“This woman from the village came to the clinic and we did not have enough 
money. I know her very well so I gave her the incentive money. I work here so it 
is easy for me to get the money from Dr.[name]. For her, it takes too long to get to 
the clinic. I don’t want her to have to come back.  But I was also afraid that I 
would not get the money back and people would say that I made it up. In the end, 
it was fine. Dr. [Name] was a good man and he believed me.”  
 - Health Facility Staff, Kapisa (Discussion 024) 
In another clinic, health facility staff said that he only gave cash incentives to women 
who asked for the payment. He explained:  
“I only give money to people who ask for the money. The people who do not ask, 
there is no need to volunteer the information. If we do, we will not have enough 
money for the other people.”   
- Vaccinator, Faryab  (Discussion 043) 
 
In summary, a variety of approaches was used to ensure to address payment delays (see 





provider and the patient that when the money is available, they will receive the payment. 






Table 6.1: Feasibility – Supply side Readiness for Institutional Delivery  
 
 Name and Type 
of Facility  
Type of 
Facility 










referrals on the 
day of the visit 
Health Facility Staff- 
At least 1 female nurse, 
midwife or physician  
on staff 
1 Ashtergram CHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
2 Serkhankhil  CHC+ 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
3 Sanjan BHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. No  Yes No No No 
4 Qazaq CHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
5 Jamal Agha  BHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. No Yes Yes No Yes 
6 Bolaghain CHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
7 Malekar SRHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m No Yes No No No 
8 Durnama BHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. No No No No No 
9 Qurghan CHC  CHC 8:30 a.m. – 3:30 p.m. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
 
SRHC = Sub rural heath center; BHC = Basic Health Center; CHC = Comprehensive Health Center,  





Table 6.2: Feasibility – Supply side Readiness for DPT3 
 
 Name and Type of Facility  Type of Facility Availability of EPI vaccine and 
adequate storage  
Health Facility Staff – at least one 
doctor, nurse, or vaccinator on 
staff 
1 Ashtergram CHC Yes Yes 
2 Serkhankhil CHC+ Yes Yes 
3 Sanjan BHC Yes Yes 
4 Qazaq CHC Yes Yes 
5 Jamal Agha BHC Yes Yes 
6 Bolaghain, CHC Yes Yes 
7 Malekar Sub-rural health center No No 
8 Durnama BHC Yes Yes 

















Cash incentives to be provided to women 
after service was rendered 
 
 Delays in receiving cash 
replenishment from HWW  
 Households asking for additional 




 Women were given ‘promise notes’ 
instead of cash, and asked to return 
later to redeem the cash 
 Health facility staff take cash from 
their own fund to give to the women 
and replenish when cash is available 
 For DPT3, women were offered 
option to bring her child back to 
receive the vaccine when cash is 
available 
 Women were asked to come back 
for cash 
 In the combined arm, some CHWs 
stopped referring women to health 
facilities  
 
Payment to CHWs based on referral slips 
on a monthly basis 
 
 Some CHWs did not receive 
incentives for all the referrals due 
to missing referral slips, poor 
documentation at the health 
facility, and/or funds not being 
available  
 
 CHWs text head of households to 
remind the woman to bring the 
referral slip 
 Incentive payment based on CHW 
records (and not referral slips) 





 Occasional delays in CHW 
payment  
some health facilities  
Communication about the CCT project 
using posters/leaflets at the health facility  
 Limited communication channel.  
 Low level of literacy among 
community members 
 
 Households learn about the 
incentive program through informal 
channels. 








Chapter 7: Discussion 
 
7.1. Key Findings  
Underutilization of essential health services is a persistent and multifaceted problem in 
many low- and middle-income countries. The Afghanistan CCT project aims to address 
some of the demand side barriers through provision of cash incentives to households and 
CHWs. In this study, I found a positive association in the household arm for both 
institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccination. However, no association was observed in 
the CHW arm. Finally, while a small positive association was observed between cash 
incentive and DPT3 vaccination in the combined arm, a negative association was 
observed between cash incentive and institutional delivery in the combined arm.  
 
Cash incentive to households  
Global evidence to date on the effect of CCT on institutional delivery and immunization 
remains mixed.  For institutional delivery, Lim et al. reported a large increase in the 
proportion of pregnant women who delivered at a health facility 2-3 years into the 
implementation of India’s JSY program; however, Powell et al. observed a much smaller 
increase (4%), and only among respondents who have heard about the incentive scheme 
in Nepal. [3, 52] Similarly, for immunization, Attanasio and Mesnard found a 9 % 
increase in compliance with DPT vaccination for children less than 24 months of age but 
no effect for older children in Columbia. [77] Morris et al. reported an increase of 6.9% 
among children below the age of 3 who have received the first dose of DPT vaccination 





Barham et al. reported a small increase in immunization against measles (3% after 6 
months) in Mexico. [86]   
 
Cash incentive to households appears to have a positive effect on institutional delivery 
and DPT3 vaccination. In particular, women in the household arm are twice as likely to 
bring their child in for DTP3 vaccination.  Nevertheless, utilization rates for both services 
remain low. 
 
 Several reasons may account for observing a larger positive effect in the DPT3 
vaccination component of the study.  The first is the notable supply-side constraints for 
institutional delivery. According to the rapid health facility assessment, most facilities 
sampled did not have the basic infrastructure  (i.e., water, electricity, 24 hour access and 
midwives) to provide safe delivery and capacity to transport patients for emergency 
referral. In contrast, DPT3 vaccination was more readily available at health facilities 
sampled in the study. Indeed, in a few communities visited, respondents consistently 
referred to the intervention as the ‘vaccine money’.  
 
The second reason may be that cultural barriers against delivering at a health facility 
remain prevalent in many parts of Afghanistan. Based on interviews, and consistent with 
a number of previous studies in Afghanistan, many women indicated they prefer to 
deliver at home, or are pressured by to do so by family. Information on safe delivery 
should to be a main component of the communication campaign if the Ministry decides to 






Third, distance to facility remains a key barrier for many households living in rural areas 
and the issue may not be addressed by cash incentive alone. Analysis shows that uptake 
of services remain highest among women who live closer to the health facility and from 
wealthier families for institutional delivery.  For instance, in Karan wa Manjan the 
district assigned to the combined arm in Badakhshan is mountainous and remote. 
Services are often interrupted during the winter months with road closures.  
 
Several issues were observed with program implementation including frequent and 
lengthy payment delays to households and CHWs, and poor communication about the 
program, particularly to the poor and non-literate population. In Faryab and Kapisa, 
interviewers noted delays in payment caused tension between households and CHWs, 
between households and health facility staff, and between CHWs and health facility staff. 
Fear of angering community members led some CHWs to not refer women to health 
facilities, and some health facility staff to “ration” payment by providing less cash to 
each recipient.  
 
Cash incentive to CHWs 
This study did not detect a difference in odds of service utilization between districts that 
provided cash incentives to CHWs for completed referrals and the control districts that 
did not provide cash incentives to CHWs. Payments to CHWs is a complex issue and one 
that is not explored in-detail in this study. Global evidence suggests that while incentive 





incentive alone is not enough. Of equal importance is having a supportive environment, 
having community recognition, and having an opportunity for career advancement. In 
Afghanistan, I did not find studies on the effect of cash incentives on CHW motivation 
and retention. However, a recent study conducted by Dale on the effect of performance-
based payment schemes on provider motivation and quality of care in Afghanistan sheds 
some light on health workforce motivation. In her study, she found that the promise of 
additional payment to providers (through a results based financing program) did not 
affect performance. Instead,, her study noted that, training,  supportive work 
environment, and regular salary payments are likely to be important factors. [101].  While 
her study focuses on the formal health sector workers, who receive regular salary 
payments, some observations are likely to be applicable to the volunteer cadre. 
 
Similar to issues noted in the analysis of cash incentive to households, it is difficult to 
detangle how much of the observed association (or lack of association) is due to the 
intervention, and how much is a result of poor implementation.  Certainly, among the 
different groups of interviewees participating in this study, CHWs were the most vocal 
about dissatisfaction with the CCT scheme: many complained about receiving partial 
payments for the referrals and lengthy and unpredictable delays. Future design of the 
program will need to develop an effect way to transfer cash to health facilities for timely 
incentive payments, which is not an easy feat given the nascent stage of development in 







Cash Incentives to CHWs and Households (Combined Arm) 
A more surprising finding from this study is the negative association between the 
combined arm and program outcome. For institutional delivery, women in the combined 
arm are less likely to deliver at a health facility compared to the control group. For DPT3 
vaccination, cash incentive in the combined arm is associated with higher odds of DPT3 
vaccination compared to the control arm. 
 
A couple of possibilities may explain the findings. As discussed in Chapter 1, the 
intervention groups were purposely selected and systematic differences in health service 
utilization and socio-economic status were observed at baseline. In addition, due to the 
poor quality of the baseline study, I only utilize the endline study to assess the program 
effect and relied on comparisons between the intervention and the control arms based on 
one point in time.  While attempts were made to control for factors that may influence the 
outcome in the analysis at the individual and household level, there are likely unobserved 
factors at the district and province level that contributed to the finding.  
 
A second possibility is that the cash incentive scheme, as designed and implemented, 
negatively impacted on service utilization in the combined arm.. Interviews with two 
CHWs in the combined arm district in Kapisa province suggest that delays in payments to 
the households became a source of stress for them and as a result, they stopped referring 
women for services. To better understand the effect of providing cash incentive to both 
households and CHWs on program outcome, a study using matched design at the facility 






Uptake of Incentive Scheme 
Despite the inconclusiveness of the findings, some interesting observations are noted.  
First, analysis suggests that uptake of the two conditionalities differ by household and 
individual characteristics.  In particular younger women are more likely to participate in 
the CCT program for institutional delivery, while age does not appear to be a predictor of 
service uptake for DTP3 vaccination. Distance from facility has a larger influence on 
likelihood of institutional delivery than DPT3 vaccination. While it is not possible to 
discern how much of the observed pattern in service utilization was due to regular care-
seeking behavior, and how much was affected by the conditional cash transfer program, it 
suggests that program design may need to take into account ‘market’ segmentation for 
different conditionalities. 
 
Second, the large variability among villages in the uptake of cash transfer for both DPT3 
and institutional delivery suggests that contextual factors and program implementation 
play a role in determining program outcome. This is consistent with findings from other 
studies: Lim et al noted that uptake of the JSY program ranged from 4% to 48 % among 
states in India. Powell et al. also found large variability in program implementation at the 
health facility level. This finding underscores a need to conduct feasibility study in the 










In this study, several factors shaped how the program was implemented: quality of 
program administration and monitoring; technical assistance and training provided to 
health facilities; supply-side readiness to deliver the incentivized outcomes; 
communication with stakeholders; and timely delivery of cash to beneficiaries. Among 
the issues highlighted, one factor emerged as a particular challenge for the Afghan 
program, and that is the technical capacity of the implementing organization. Limited 
capacity of HWW to implement the project resulted in a cascade of problems that 
affected the overall implementation of the program and the evaluation of the intervention.  
Health facility staff did not receive adequate training on cash flow management and no 
feedback mechanism was in place for front-line staff to communicate these issues to the 
Ministry and/or HWW headquarters. Communication about the program relied heavily on 
printed-text, which was not appropriate for a population with a low literacy rate. Finally 
the lack of experience in designing and conducting evaluation affected the reliability and 
validity of the quantitative evaluation.  
 
These challenges are not necessarily unique to Afghanistan. In Nepal, Powell- Jackson et 
al. observed problems at the central level to effectively manage and implement the 
program that led to lengthy funding delays and confusion about eligibility criteria at the 
field level. Research on the India program- JSY- also noted challenges with state level 





to pay women for delivering at home, and difficulty in standardizing the implementation 
guidelines across states.   
7.2 Conditional Cash Transfer in Fragile States 
Health systems in fragile states face a particular set of challenges. In recent years, there 
has been growing interest to pilot conditional cash transfer programs in post-conflict 
settings. However, no studies to date explore the question of whether CCT is an 
appropriate intervention in post-conflict settings.  
 
Findings from this study suggest that CCT may be an effective mechanism to increase 
utilization of services. However, it cautions that in many situations CCT is not likely to 
be an appropriate intervention.   
 
First, as underscored by a majority of studies on CCT, supply side readiness of the 
services included in the scheme is a necessity.  In fragile settings, services are often either 
not available, or not consistently available.  This may be due to insecurity, migration of 
health facility staff, and dilapidated infrastructure.  Until services are available on a 
consistent basis, it is unlikely that demand-side interventions can achieve the gains 
expected.  Patients’ ability to access services and receive care is also a determining factor 
in the outcome of CCT interventions. If the impact of conflict means that patients cannot 
travel freely, women are not able to leave their homes or that government facilities such 








This section looks into limitations of this study including study design and data quality.  
 
Study Design 
There are several limitations with the study design, which limited conclusions that may 
be drawn on the effect of the conditional cash transfer on service utilization.  First and 
foremost, the main source of data used to assess the association between cash transfer and 
service utilization was data from a cross-sectional survey. One shortcoming of relying on 
the cross-sectional survey conducted at the end of the program cycle, is that I was not 
able to assess temporal changes.  
 
A second (and related) limitation is that districts were purposely selected and assigned to 
one of the study arms. As a result, imbalances in sample characteristics were observed on 
a number of key factors. As noted in Chapters 1, compared to women who reside in the 
intervention arms districts, women who reside in the control arm districts were more 
likely to be educated, lived in wealthier households, and lived closer to a health facility. 
Furthermore, higher percentage of women interviewed in the control arm reported having 
prior deliveries at a health facility. The combined arm had very low maternal care rate at 
enrollment, which made the arm almost incomparable to other study arms. While 
statistical techniques may be used to improve the balance between the control and 
intervention arms, poor design and measurement issues are difficult to overcome.  As 





intervention design that would allow policy makers to ascertain efficacy of CCT on 
service utilization in Afghanistan.  
 
Unmeasured Spillover Effect 
The household survey was analyzed based on intention to treat (ITT). That is, results are 
based on the initial treatment assignment (i.e., women who reside in districts assigned to 
one of the study arms) and not on the treatment eventually received.  In this study, three 
out of four provinces have at least one intervention district that borders another 
intervention district, making it plausible and possible that women residing in one area 
may have utilized services in another area in order to receive the cash incentive. In 
Wardak and Faryab, this is not likely to have a strong influence on program results, as 
health facilities are not clustered around the border areas.  
 
Data Quality 
The data collectors received training on qualitative and quantitative methods, and were 
supervised by data quality managers. Nevertheless, several data issues were noted. For 
the household survey they include: incomplete surveys, instances where data collectors 
did not follow the sampling frame, and mistakes in data entry. Furthermore, data 
collected on the age of respondent was truncated at 35. This is likely due to poor data 
collection rather than a true reflection of the respondents’ age.  Not obtaining a valid 






For the qualitative survey, the main issue was the delay in receiving the translated 
transcripts. This was a particular problem in insecure provinces, where opportunities to 
revisit the households were not available. To address these issues, the Ministry is 
investing in electronic data collection tools that would allow supervisors quick access to 










Chapter 8: Policy Recommendations 
 
Based on findings from this study, below are recommendations for the MoPH as well as 
other line ministries, development partners, and organizations to consider if a CCT type 
project is to be designed and implemented in the future. 
 
Policy Recommendation 1:  Select conditionalities that are feasible and easy to 
implement. 
 
In Afghanistan, many basic health facilities and some comprehensive health facilities 
lack the resources and infrastructure to provide normal deliveries and respond to 
emergency referrals. Given the lack of supply-side readiness to provide normal deliveries 
at basic health centers, a more appropriate intervention may be to condition payment on 
antenatal and postnatal care. In Afghanistan, evidence shows that antenatal care is a 
strong predictor for institutional delivery. [94] Unlike institutional delivery, antenatal 
services are more widely available in Afghanistan. In addition, the service may be 
accessed at a time convenient for the woman and do not require the facility to be open 24 
hours a day. Indeed, evaluation of Mexico’s Opportunidades program showed that 
incentivizing women to attend antenatal care increased use of skilled birthing attendants, 
including facility-based deliveries.[102] One possible option (and one that has also been 
suggested by Lim et al for India’s JSY program) is to divide the cash payment into three 
parts: first payment can be linked to antenatal care, second payment for delivery, and 






For child health, DPT3 vaccination appears to be a promising and appropriate 
intervention to include in the CCT program. However, monitoring proved to be difficult 
as most households do not maintain vaccine cards, and facilities do not have a patient 
recordkeeping system allowing health care providers to track vaccination. A 
recommendation for immunization related conditionality is to invest in improving EPI 
record management system either before, or in parallel with, CCT program to incentive 
DPT3 vaccination.  
 
Policy Recommendation 2: Invest in supply-side strengthening for health facilities 
participating in CCT program(s). 
 
Related to the first recommendation, the MoPH should invest in supply-side interventions 
to improve quality of care. Most academics, implementers, and government ministries 
and agencies agree on the importance of ensuring availability and accessibility of quality 
health care services to deliver the conditionality [4, 31, 82, 103]. Lack of supplies and 
medical staff, as well as poor infrastructure to deliver the intervention hinders the 
effectiveness of CCT programs, and erodes trust between health care workers and 
households.  In Afghanistan, the Ministry of Health introduced a performance-based 
payments (PBP) program in 11 of the 34 provinces in 2010. During the pilot phase, a 
decision was made to not add a demand-side component CCT to these 11 provinces. 





opportunity to test the effect of having both demand and supply side incentive schemes to 
improve coverage of essential services.  
 
Policy Recommendation 3: Provide adequate technical support to field staff and 
stakeholders responsible for implementing the CCT program. To the extent possible, 
technical support should be frequent, targeted, and ongoing.  
 
In this study, a key issue raised by many health facility staff was the lack of training in 
operational matters such as financial management, maintenance of records and 
communication. In some districts, training was provided only once (at the beginning of 
the program). On-going and targeted training are needed in order to build the capacity of 
health facility staff to manage and implement CCT. 
 
Policy Recommendation 4: Select implementation partner(s) with demonstrated 
experience with implementing demand-side financing programs and capacity to conduct 
research. 
 
As suggested in Chapter 7, further research is needed to better understand efficacy and 
effectiveness of CCT in Afghanistan.  The implementing agency selected for future 
program implementation and/or evaluation will need to demonstrate sound expertise in 
the selected area(s). While cost is always a critical consideration in evaluating any 
proposal, technical capacity should be given more weight in light of the country context 






Policy Recommendation 5:  Design and implementation of CCT programs in conflict 
and post-conflict settings require additional consideration. Supply-side readiness, 
financial transfer mechanisms, adequate infrastructure, and availability of providers are 
core components of a CCT program and may not be available in fragile states.  
 
In conflict and post-conflict settings, additional factors need to be taken into 
consideration, in both the design and implementation phases. First, supply-side readiness 
needs to be assessed on a continuous basis. Due to the transitional nature of governance 
and hampered ability of the public sector to provide services, availability of human 
resources and supplies needed to deliver care are tenuous. Given the likelihood that 
service may be interrupted due to ongoing conflict and/or weak infrastructure, a 
contingency plan needs to be in place in case services are not available. This may include 
temporary suspension of the program, or contracting with private providers to deliver the 
service.  
 
Second, to the extent possible, the government should utilize mobile and digital 
technology to ensure that cash is available and delivered to the target audience on a 
timely basis.  Delays in cash disbursements and cumbersome monitoring processes are 
common implementation issues in CCT schemes. In conflict and post-conflict settings, 
these issues are often aggravated by weak institutions and on-going insecurity. Mobile 





areas are being tried in several places, including Myanmar and Kenya may be appropriate 
to pilot. [104] [7] 
 
Finally, when/if appropriate, non-governmental providers should be included in the 
incentive scheme.  Due to the limited ability of the government to provide services in 
conflict and post-conflict areas, NGOs and private providers often fill the space and 
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Appendix 1: Description of the Health System  
 
 
Similar to many countries, Afghanistan relies heavily on the community to provide 
services. It follows a “pyramid” model and includes the following levels of care:  
 
Health Posts (HP):  Health posts operate at the community level and are staffed by 
community health workers. The ministry aims to establish one health post per 100-150 
families. Ideally the health post is staffed by one male and one female CHWs, who are 
trained to provide basic curative, preventive, and referral services.  Services that CHWs 
may provide include treatments for malaria, diarrhea, tuberculosis (through community 
DOTS program) and acute respiratory infections. In addition, CHWs are responsible to 
provide basic health education, monitor nutrition and growth among children, and assist 
with immunization campaigns.  While CHWs are not responsible to assist with delivery, 
female CHWs are trained to help families develop a birthing plan, encourage women to 
seek antennal care services, refer women for institutional delivery, and provide basic 
postpartum and newborn care.  
 
Health Sub-Centers (HSC):  Health Sub-Centers are typically staffed by three people: a 
male nurse, a community midwife, and a cleaner/guard, providing services for a 
population of 3000 – 7000 people.  According to Ministry records, by 2011, there are 427 
HSCs in the country. Services provided at HSC include health education, immunization, 
antenatal care, family planning, TB case detection and follow up of TB cases, and 
treatment of some infectious diseases. Midwives will assist with normal delivery, and 
coordinate transfer of care for emergency cases.   
 
Mobile Health Team (MHT):  One strategy to provide services in remote areas is to 
deploy mobile health teams. MHTs are staffed with a male doctor or nurse, a female 
doctor, a nurse or midwife, a vaccinator, and a driver. MHT should provide all services in 
the basic health package.  
 
Basic Health Center (BHC):  BHCs are primary care clinics that provide the basic 
package of services for 15,000 – 30,000 people. By 2011, there are 812 BHCs in 
Afghanistan. Ministry regulations require BHCs to be staffed with at least one nurse, one 
CHW, and two vaccinators. In many health facilities, midwives are available to assist 
with normal deliveries. In addition, CHW supervisors, whose job is to coordinate and 
manage CHWs in the catchment area, are also stationed at the BHC.  
 
Comprehensive Health Centers (CHC):  CHCs provides secondary care services for 
30,000 to 100,000 people. MoPH aims to staff each CHC with at least one male and one 
female doctors, one male and one female nurses, one midwife, one laboratory technician, 
one vaccinator, and one pharmacist. The team is trained to handle complications and/or 






Comprehensive Health Centers + (CHC+):  CHC+ are clinics that provide all the services 
that CHCs provide. In addition, handles complications that cannot be addressed at the 
CHCs. In particular, CHC+ should be able to provide comprehensive emergency obstetric 
care services, including surgery, blood transfusion, and anesthesiology.  Unlike CHCs 
that do not have beds, CHC+ typically have 10 beds.  
 
District Hospital: DHs provide all services outlined in the BPHS and EPHS and covers a 
population around 100,000 – 300.000 people. DH is typically staffed with doctors, 
including female obstetricians/gynecologists, a surgeon, an anesthetist, midwives, lab 
technicians, a pharmacist, a pediatrician, a mental health professional, a dentist and dental 
technicians, and one to two physiotherapists.  DH serves as the referral center for 
emergency obstetric care, surgery, and complications that are not able to be resolved at 
lower level cares. 
 
Management and provision of services involves an innovative system of contracting-in 
and contracting-out for service delivery, results-based financing for performance 

















You are invited to take part in a study to help the Ministry of Public Health improve 





The interview will take about 1 hour of your time.  During the interview, you will be 
asked questions about your views on a range of health issues including delivery and 
vaccination, how you and your family make decisions about heath care, your interactions 
with health service staff and community health workers, and your thoughts on the a 
Ministry of Public Health project that provides monetary incentive to families.   
 
With your permission, we will record the interview with a digital recorder.  You do not 
have to answer any question that you feel uncomfortable with and you are free to stop the 




Being a part of this study will pose minimal risk for you.  Our main concern is that your 
anonymity will be maintained in this interview.  We will not record your name in the 
transcript.  The digital recording and transcript of the interview will be stored on a 
password-protected computer, and only the members of the project team will have access 
to this information. 
 
Should you feel uncomfortable at any time during the interview, do not want to answer a 
specific question, and/or decide you no longer want to participate, just let us know and 




With your help, we hope that the study will improve how Ministry of Public Health 







You do not have to agree to participate in this project, and you may change your mind at 
any time.   
 
If you have any questions or problems, please contact our field project officer – Mustafa 
Rahimi at 0700 221578  
 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
 
Is it okay to proceed with the interview? 
 





You are invited to take part in a study to help the Ministry of Public Health improve 
design and implementation of a project that provides cash incentives to families and 




The interview will take about 1 hour of your time.  With your permission, we will record 
the interview with a digital recorder.  You do not have to answer any question that you 




Being a part of this study will pose minimal risk for you.  Our main concern is that your 
anonymity be maintained in this interview.    There are a number of ways we plan to do 
that.  First, we will not record your name in the transcript.  Also, we will keep your job 
description general - so that you will not be identified. For instance, we will refer to you 
as  “health staff,” “ community health worker,” or “health officer” (depending on your 
position), and will not disclose the location of the health facility. Finally, we will ask two 
staff to review the transcript and remove any information that may lead someone to 
identify you as a respondent.   
 
The digital recording and transcript of the interview will be stored on a password-
protected computer.  Only the members of the project team will have access to this 
information, and they will not be allowed to share it with anyone else. All recordings will 
be destroyed at the end of this project.  
 
If at any point you feel uncomfortable, do not want to answer a specific question, and or 
decide you no longer want to participate, just let us know and we will skip the question or 








You do not have to agree to participate in this project, and you may change your mind at 
any time.   
 
If you have any questions or problems, please contact our field project officer – Mustafa 
Rahimi at 0700 221578  
 
 
PERMISSION TO PROCEED 
 






Appendix 3: Qualitative Data Source 1 - Program Discussion Summary 
 
 
Date:  19 January 2011 
 
Location: Hope World Wide Offices, Kabul 
 
Participants: Hope World Wide: Program Manager, Data Manager 
MOPH/HEFD:  Director of Health Economics, CCT Program Manager 
Health Systems 20/20: Ann Lin, Deloitte Staff (Note Taker) 
 
Overview: The DSF team from HWW, MOPH/HEFD and Health Systems 20/20 met to discuss 
program and baseline implementation, monitoring instruments and procedures and 
begin initial discussions on the endline evaluation. 
 
Program Implementation 
 HWW Provincial Officers – One per province. Provide provincial level oversight and are in 
close contact with the HWW Field Officers. Collate information and all paperwork from the 
district HWW Field Officers to send to HWW Kabul headquarters (HQ) on a monthly basis. 
 HWW Field Officers – The liaisons between the health facilities at the district level and the 
Provincial Officers. They visit each participating health facility at least two times each month.  
 MOPH support – Representatives from the OB/GYN and vaccine department received an 
official request from the MOPH to introduce the HWW team and request support for the 
project. 
 Financial Flow – A DSF project bank account was setup within each province (managed by 
the HWW Provincial Officer).  The HWW Provincial Officers provide written requests to 
HWW Kabul HQ for funds, which include incentives, transportation costs for monitoring and 
office expenses. Each HWW Field Officer nominated and selected one representative at the 
health facility level to receive and disburse financial incentives. The Provincial Officer 
provides and monitors the funds to the HWW Field Officers for incentives. The HWW Field 
Officer then provides and monitors the funds to the financial representative at each health 
facility. The CHWs in Districts 2 and 3 receive incentive payments one time per month and 
sign a standard project payment record form. The payment record forms are checked against 
the register books (both the DSF specific register books and the standard BPHS facility 
register books for vaccines and deliveries).   At the end of each month the HWW Field 
Officers submit the payment record forms together with the referral vouchers to the HWW 
Provincial Officer. All payment record forms are then submitted to HWW Kabul HQ and 
entered into a payment database. Each payment record form has key information including the 
village/community name in addition to the district name. Finance Officer at HWW Kabul HQ 
checks that each village/community name matches the defined catchment area. If a 
village/community outside the appropriate catchment area received an incentive payment 
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(which has happened), it is noted in the payment database. All HWW Provincial Officers and 
Field Officers were trained by HWW Kabul HQ to standardize payment mechanisms and 
forms. HWW recently added economic status and education to the payment record form. 
 Referral Vouchers – Standard DSF project referral vouchers are given by the CHWs to their 
clients. The clients bring the vouchers in to the health facilities when seeking services (DPT3 
or delivery). The HWW Field Officer collects all the vouchers every 15 days at each health 
facility, checks the vouchers against the register books (both the DSF specific register books 
and the standard BPHS facility register books for vaccines and deliveries). At the end of each 
month the HWW Field Officers submit the vouchers to the HWW Provincial Officer who then 
submit the vouchers with the payment record forms to HWW Kabul HQ. Initially, District 4 
did not use project referral vouchers, but this was later instituted. 
 Monitoring – At least two times a month the HWW Field Officer randomly selects and 
follows up with 10-20 percent of beneficiaries at their homes to verify payment was received. 
Each month the HWW Provincial Officer also randomly selects and follow up with 10-20 
percent of beneficiaries at their homes to verify payment was received. Transportation costs 
for monitoring are provided by HWW Kabul HQ. Each quarter HWW Kabul HQ staff 
participate in monitoring jointly with HWW Provincial Officers and HWW Field Officers. 
Observations and information are included in quarterly monitoring reports for each province. 
In Districts 4 (control districts), the HWW team was finding that sometimes the districts were 
grouping all deliveries (at home, by TBA, in facilities) into the category of facility deliveries 
to show that the facilities did more work/supported more deliveries. The HWW team cited 
examples of inflated reporting for DPT3 in Districts 4 also. For this reason, in September 
2010 the HWW team initiated DSF project registries for facility births and DPT3 in Districts 4 
at all health facilities. 
 Community Health Workers –  MOPH/HEFD and Health Systems 20/20 team will meet with 
the MOPH Community Health Unit to get a better understanding of the services provided by 
CHWs and the pictorial monitoring records kept by CHWs. Hopefully CHWs keep records 
regarding pregnancies/ANC visits to provide a denominator for DSF project indicators 
Community Health Supervisors (CHS) in each community can serve as important resources 
for collecting key information and insight during endline evaluation. Standard HMIS 
indicators does not include CHW referrals. Some provinces may use CHW referrals but in 
general health facilities do not collect/keep the referral slips if used. 
 DSF Program Awareness – At program initiative, HWW conducted trainings for project staff 
and CHWs on the project as well as filling out the standard forms. Each month community 
groups hold meetings and HWW Field Officers participate in these meetings to provide 
information and answer questions about the DSF program. HWW created several promotional 
materials (text) including banners, posters for health facilities (in the vaccination centers and 
delivery wards) as well as leaflets to share with the community. HWW printed approximately 





 Sample Calculation: HWW requested official information on the number of households in 
provinces to the Central Statistics Office, but that information was not available. Katie 
Indarawis (statistician for HWW) calculated the sample size by dividing the population in 
each village/community by an approximate family-size. However, often several families share 
one household. Katie Indarawis provided a list of how many households to identify in each 
village/community. 
 Sampling Procedure: The HWW team randomly selected a starting point in a 
village/community (had a map and chose a point at random) and then surveyed every 10
th
 
household (until reaching the specified number of households by the HWW statistician). It 
was very rare that no one answered the door, but if this happened, a neighboring household 
was surveyed. 
 Survey Staffing: All HWW staff were involved with the baseline survey. In addition, one 
female and her close male relative were recruited for each province to conduct the household 
surveys. 
 Survey Procedure: Female interviews asked if there was a woman of child-bearing age (11 to 
49 years of age) within the household. The woman had to be married (single women and 
widows were excluded). One woman per household was interviewed. Informed consent was 
received before beginning the interviews. Baseline survey implementation (including training, 
piloting and data collection) took approximately two months. 
 
Documents Shared by HWW: 
 Excel sheets from HWW Statistician calculating the sample size for the baseline survey. 
These files include how many villages/communities are in each district and health facility 
catchment area. 
 Electronic version of the Incentive Voucher (Payment Record) to be filled out at the BPHS 
facility for each client that receives any incentive payment 
 Electronic version of the Control District Referral Form to be filled out at the BPHS facility 
 Excel files of monthly HWW Statistical Reports summarizing per province and district: actual 
babies delivered, DPT3 vaccination delivered, and incentives paid. Files from July 2009 
through October 2010. 
 Electronic versions of CHW referral forms for each province 
 Excel files of monthly client registration data by province and district. Files from July 2009 
through November 2010. 
 Excel file of the number of CHWs per province, district, and health facility 
 
 
Date:  18 January 2011 
 




Participants:  MOPH/HEFD:  CCT /DSF Program manager, M&E Specialist  
Health Systems 20/20: Ann Lin (Note taker), Deloitte Staff 
 
Overview: MoPH provided an overview of the CCT/DSF project. The team discussed key issues 
with the program and whether or not to move forward with a mid-line evaluation 
 
 
 MoPH staff described the project design and the overall management structure.  
 CCT/DSF includes 4 arms: control, HH, CHW, and Combined arm 
 Within MoPH, the program is managed by CCT/DSF Manager.  
 There is another project that focuses on the supply side (Results Based Financing). The pilot 
is financed by the World Bank.  
 MoPH staff expressed frustration with the project and the implementing partner:  “Difficult 
time with the project at the beginning. We were not too happy for many reasons. They did not 
have the right people for this project. We had to provide them with many guidelines and 
sometimes do things for them. We made a mistake in choosing them. Now we are close to the 
end of the project and we still have many problems.  
 Baseline study was poorly designed, however highlighted concern with the selection of pilot 
sites.  
 According to baseline, in most provinces, the control site has higher percentage of HH that 
reported institutional delivery and DPT3 vaccination according to baseline report 
 MoPH manager: “ In the end, too many things went wrong. We did not have a good baseline 
survey and had so many delays for the mid-term survey that we decided to cancel. This is a 
good program. Helps many people.  I mean it can help many people in Afghanistan, but too 
may problems.  
 MoPH Manager:  “I will give you the quarterly reports and you will see.  From the very 
beginning, we had problems with them. They were not good.  So much money spent on 
implementing the program and correcting mistakes. Not enough money that goes to the 
households. You will see in the report.”  
 Decision not to move forward with mid-term survey  









This brief provides a summary of insights and analysis from key informant interviews conducted by 
Dr. Alawi, Ann Lin and Lindsay Morgan between June 4 – 13, 2011.
6
 The interviews are meant to 
provide background for the research protocol, which will be developed in July 2011 by HEFD, in 
collaboration with HS20/20 and HPRO. With that in mind, the aims of the key informant interviews 
were to: 
 Learn details about the implementation of the CCT pilot; 
 Understand the broader contextual factors that may have affected the impact of the scheme; 
 Understand stakeholder perceptions about the CCT pilot; 
 Understand stakeholder perceptions about the CCT concept; and 
 Learn what the health policy community in Kabul is hoping to learn from the assessment.   
 
Key informants were chosen for their involvement in the pilot and/or knowledge about maternal and 
child health (MCH) programming in Afghanistan, and include representatives from: Hope 
Worldwide; BPHS implementing organizations; relevant MOPH departments; and various donor 




Overall, despite some conceptual and philosophical concerns about CCTs (discussed below), there is 
a broad consensus among external stakeholders that CCTs are an important tool to try in order to 
increase utilization of essential MCH services. And despite challenges with implementation, 
perceptions among HWW and BPHS implementers were also generally positive: they seem to think 




Conversations with representatives from HWW and the BPHS implementers indicate poor 
coordination between HWW and implementing agencies, and a degree of variation about some details 
of implementation, specifically about who was responsible at health facilities for managing the 
incentive money, and related paperwork. Other important issues—such as training and sensitization, 
and monitoring and verification of results—were characterized by generalizations. There were hints, 
however, that stakeholders may not have understood their roles, and that these crucial functions were 
not well implemented. This is a key area to probe in the interviews conducted in the field. 
 
Many other important factors also emerged. For example, BPHS implementers were reluctant to 
                                                 
6 Detailed notes from interviews were typed up and analyzed within 24 hours of the interview by Lindsay Morgan. The team 
then met to compare their impressions. The synthesis presented in this summary reflects their shared views. See Appendix 2 
for detailed notes. 
7 See Annex 1 for a list of key informants.  
8 Some of the BPHS implementers cite rough estimates of the data from their facilities that show modest increases in the 
uptake of some services. For some, the CCT concept (giving cash to poor people) makes sense intuitively. It is worth noting 
that the BPHS implementers gained little from participation in the program (health facility were not paid for extra work), so 
their enthusiasm is interesting. It could be motivated, as could HWW’s views, by the hope of future funding. Most likely, 




participate in the program because health facilities were not compensated for the extra work; they did 
not want to assume the risk implied by assuming responsibility for the management of the cash; and 
they were concerned about bearing the brunt of complaints from the community once the incentive 
stopped. The degree to which these issues effected implementation will be critical to gauge in the 
study. Another key theme was the importance of the quality of care at facilities: many respondents 
agree that this is a more important barrier to address to improve demand for services than the 
financial barrier. The interviews also revealed many potential confounding factors, such as supply-
strengthening efforts, other incentive programs, and even a halt in funds to health facilities due to 
implementing agency management changes, which may have effected the impact of the incentive 
program. 
 
Considered carefully, HEFD can find guidance from these interviews about where to focus in the 
qualitative evaluation. The interviews also signify the level of technical and political consensus that is 
required for political buy-in for future CCT schemes. From external stakeholders, calls for policy 




In December 2008, Hope World Wide (HWW), a U.S.-based NGO, was contracted by the Afghan 
MOPH, in collaboration with the Global Alliance for Vaccines and Immunization (GAVI), to 
implement a 2-year conditional cash transfer (CCT) pilot program in four provinces (Badakhshan, 
Faryab, Kapisa and Wardak) in Afghanistan. The program offers cash incentives to mothers 
conditional on delivery in a facility and DPT3 immunization for their children (and) to community 
health workers conditional on referrals for these services.   
 
The pilot has two broad aims: 
 
 To stimulate demand (and therefore utilization) by women and their families for two key 
services: facility-based delivery and DPT3 immunization. The Afghan government HSS 
Program Funding Application describes the rationale behind the use of cash incentives to 
stimulate this change: “Demand side financing may be useful in overcoming socio-cultural 
obstacles that impede the use of services especially by women. It is envisaged that this is a 
short-term solution that will only be required until women are convinced of the value of the 
services and until female literacy rates have improved.”  
 
 To motivate community health workers (CHWs) to refer women to facilities for these services: 
“According to 2006 HMIS data, each CHW only referred an average of 3.9 persons to health 
facilities per quarter, a figure which is considered alarmingly low. The intent of this pilot 
program is to test whether provision of incentives for CHWs, who otherwise are volunteers, 
will increase the accomplishment of priority targets (increasing the percentage of deliveries by 
skilled birth attendants and achievement of full immunization of children) of the BPHS.”  
 
The program launched in July 2009 and ended in May 2011. A baseline and end-line household 
survey were conducted by HWW. The MOPH and HS 20/20 will complement these surveys with 






Training & Sensitization  
 
In order for a program to be successful, stakeholders must fully understand their roles and 
responsibilities, and beneficiaries must be aware of and understand the program from which they are 
supposed to benefit. In the CCT pilot, the degree to which training and sensitization were sufficient 
(and with what frequency follow-up training and sensitization was conducted, and to what effect) is 
unclear.  
 
There were at least four necessary levels of training: Provincial Supervisors, District Field Officers, 
CHWs, and health facility staff. But interviews suggest that not everyone understood their roles. For 
example, in Wardak, BPHS implementers told us that when the health facilities learned about the 
incentive, it caused jealousy among staff, who felt it was unfair that there was yet another incentive 
for deliveries for the midwife (evidently, midwives receive $6 per delivery in BPHS facilities in 
Wardak facilities managed by the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan). This remark suggests that 
the facility thought the incentive was for facility staff, and not for families. (It also demonstrates that, 
although one of the requirements for district selection was that there be no other incentive schemes in 
operation, that this was not always the case.) In another example, HWW visited a CHW during a 
supervision visit who complained about not receiving the incentive. When HWW checked with the 
facility, they found that the CHW had referred a measles patient, and therefore, did not understand 
that the incentive was for DPT3 and delivery only.  
 
To sensitize communities, HWW placed posters in village bazaars; posted leaflets in health facilities; 
and held meetings with various community organizations, including health shuras, and community 
development committees. But according to interviews, sometimes families travelled outside their 
district for health services, to facilities where they would not receive an incentive. This may be due to 
superior quality at those facilities, or it could be because they were unaware of or did not understand 
the incentive program.  
 
Financial Management  
 
At each health facility, one or more staff members were assigned to manage the incentive payment 
and associated paperwork.
9
 Our interviews suggest there was no standardized system for this 
procedure in facilities. Some informants said that within health facilities, financial management was 
the responsibility of the vaccinator; others, that the midwives were also involved; and still others, that 
the in-charge oversaw the process. This raises questions about responsibility and accountability for 




Prior to program launch, HWW, HEFD and representatives from BPHS implementers met in Kabul 
to discuss the program.  HWW said this was important, in order to impress upon the BPHS 
                                                 
9 This would include receiving the referral form from the patient upon arrival, signing the payment voucher (which verified 
that payment was delivered), and giving the incentive to the family (FOs provided the incentives to the CHWs). 
 
 174 
implementers that the MOPH was behind the scheme (see discussion below about NGO reluctance to 
engage). Following the meeting, according to most of the BPHS implementers, there was little or no 
follow up from HWW.
10
 There is a high degree of dissatisfaction and concern about this, as BPHS 
implementers were unaware of what was happening in their facilities around the money exchanging 
hands. (One implementer acknowledged that this was also their own shortcoming: they should have 
kept more careful track of this.) 
 
Monitoring & Verification  
 
Among HWW staff, descriptions of how monitoring and verification were managed were consistent 
but vague. As this is a key function of any pay-for-performance scheme, it will be important to probe 
this issue deeply with stakeholders during the study interviews, particularly as the institutions 
responsible for paying families (the health facilities) were essentially “outside” the program. 
Monitoring and verification may have been weak (indeed, when asked what they would do differently 
in the next CCT scheme, several HWW informants said they would choose different provinces and 
districts that were easier to supervise). There may have been problems with the cash at facilities that 
HWW was either unaware of or unable to police. There is a large knowledge gap here that will need 




There were questions from all groups of key informants, about the overall design of the program. 
 
 A common refrain was that the incentive amount may have been too small, and should have 
varied depending on the region. In some areas, the payment to families seems to have been 
more than enough to compensate for travel costs, while in others, it did not come close to 
covering the cost of transportation. 
 There were also questions about rewarding facility birth, as opposed to skilled birth 
attendance, and of rewarding facility-based immunization, when there were mobile outreach 
campaigns in some areas. 
 The fact that health facilities were not compensated for the extra work (paying incentives, 
maintain registries) was universally cited as a significant shortcoming of the program. (It is 
unclear what affect this may have had on facilities; it may have been hugely demotivating, 
may have created tensions among staff, and may have induced cheating—these areas must be 
probed during the study). 




A complicated web of contextual factors was illuminated from key informant interviews, which may 
have effected (for better or worse) the impact of the CCT. These include: 
 
 There were other incentive programs being implemented simultaneously in CCT pilot 
                                                 




 There are many facility-level issues, which informants say are a more significant determinant 
of patient demand, including: the lack of female health workers; absenteeism, especially 
among midwives; the poor quality of services, including lack of privacy, lack of respect and 
kindness from staff, lack of equipment. 
 Informants also cited personal, cultural preferences as a key determinant of patient demand, 
including: women want their husbands at the delivery with them; they are more comfortable at 
home; home delivery is normal and expected.  
 Security and transport issues also loom large as the major barriers to increasing demand for 
and access to services 
 Some informants questioned the feasibility of normative changes through social diffusion in 
disparate communities, where communication of any kind is difficult.  
 On CHWs, informants were divided about whether or not they should be compensated, but 
emphasize that they are motivated by many other factors besides money, including: altruism; 
desire to acquire new skills; prestige; and the hope of future benefits (such as formal 
employment in the health sector).  
 
What External stakeholders Hope to Learn from the Assessment 
 
 Sustainability: Is the program sustainable? Are there funds to pay for scale up, and once you 
begin paying incentives to spur complex behavior change, how long do you have to pay them?   
 Program Learning: Stakeholders want a strong set of lessons learned about implementation / 
operationalization. How did the program work: what were the challenges, how were they 
overcome (or not), and what worked well? What could have been done differently/better in 
terms of design? What recommendations can HEFD give to others who are considering 
whether or not to test incentives to families and/or CHWs? 
 Policy Implications: What are the broader policy implications? Will this program be scaled 
up? Should it be paired with supply-strengthening activities? 
 Design: Are financial constraints the most important constraints to address or are other 
barriers are more significant? Were these the right indicators? Were the payment amounts 
correct? 
 Equity: Was the program equitable? Would families who benefitted from the incentive have 
gone to facilities anyway? Did the flat incentive amount to families, irrespective of where they 
lived, work? 
 Cost-effectiveness: Is it cost-effective? Given the range of options for addressing barriers to 
demand for and access to MCH services, is paying cash incentives the best option? 
 
Philosophical and Conceptual Concerns about CCTs  
 
 Paying cash incentives cannot address the chief constraints to increasing demand for and 
access to key MCH services. 
 There is not sufficient capacity to manage a CCT program. 
 A program of cash incentives is particularly prone to corruption, and may induce cheating.   
 Paying people to do what they should do anyway, voluntarily, will interfere with their 
intrinsic motivation. (This mainly applied to CHWs but a few stakeholders also voiced this 
concern in terms of mothers and families.) 
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 Incentivizing CHWs for certain services will lead to neglect of others. 
 Paying incentives is not sustainable (and once you end the program, you risk the unintended 
consequence that people will no longer do what they have been paid to do). 
 
*It is important to note that none of these concerns are unique to Afghanistan, nor is there any 




Overall, a number of important lessons were learned from the key informant interviews, namely: 
 
 The incentive amount may not have been appropriate in all areas.  
 Lack of compensation for facilities is viewed as a major problem. 
 Coordination is critical and appears to have been weak in the pilot.  
 CCT schemes require capacity to manage, and robust verification systems (verifying your 
own program creates a conflict of interests). 
 Many of the challenges identified by HWW (sometimes phrased as things they would change 
next time) were not in their control, such as issues at the health facilities, province selection 
and other key design issues like incentive amount. 
 Facility/supply issues dominate. 
 
Looking Ahead: Stakeholder Buy-in 
 
There seems to a consensus that information about the CCT program was not adequately shared with 
stakeholders. There is a palpable sense of frustration about this among stakeholders. However, 
interviews suggest that if the MOPH invests in building consensus around these issues, some 
informants who are “on the fence” about CCTs (neither strongly opposed nor strongly in favor), may 
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Teaching Experience 
 
Teaching Assistant for the following courses 
 
 Health Systems in Low and Middle Income Countries 




March 2015 – Current, Head of Health Systems – 3MDG Fund                 Yangon, Burma 
 
 Manage $50 million dollar grant portfolio that supports the Ministry of Health in the following 
areas: Supply Chain, Evidence-based Policy Making, Human Resources for Health, Community 
Engagement, and Governance, Health Management Information System. 
 Provided technical support in the development of key health systems initiatives including health 




January 2011 – January 2015, Manager - Deloitte Consulting LLP     Arlington, VA  
 
 Haiti Results Based Financing: Developed implementation strategy and monitored roll-out of the 
Results Based Financing (RBF) scheme to increase quality and quantity of health care services in 
80 health care facilities in Haiti with a budget of $1.2 million dollars. 
 Mozambique Health Financing Strategy: Assisted in the development of the health financing 
strategy in Mozambique. In partnership with the World Bank, WHO, UNICEF and DFID 
conducted analysis on fiscal space for health and risk-pooling options.  
 TOMS shoes: Developed strategic partnerships for TOMS shoes’ one-to-one giving campaign in 
Mozambique. Assisted TOMS shoes in identifying and short-listing potential partners. Structured 
multi-year partnership between the Red Cross/Mozambique and TOMS that resulted in shipment 
of 300,000 pairs of shoes.  
 Rwanda Results Based Financing: Led fiduciary risk assessment of Rwanda’s RBF mechanism. 
In collaboration with USAID/Mozambique and USAID/Rwanda, conducted in-depth interviews 
with key partners, assessed data collection and verification process, and documented financial 
payment system.  
 Evaluation of the Conditional Cash Transfer Project in Afghanistan: Supported program 
assessment of the conditional cash transfer initiative in Afghanistan.   
 Revenue generation strategy in Afghanistan: Developed revenue generation strategy and 
implementation plan for the Ministry of Health in Afghanistan. The objective of the strategy is to 
reduce dependence on donor financing by 70% by 2020. Activities include analysis of feasibility 
of tobacco tax and mobile phone tax.  
May 2008 - November 2011, Independent Consultant     Washington, DC
  
 Jordan Investment Board: Main author of the public-private partnership strategy to finance and 
develop a health city in Irbid, Jordan; conducted analysis of pharmaceutical, bio-technology, and 
medical tourism markets; provided advice on financing structures and instruments; coordinated 
stakeholder meetings with investors and government officials. 
 Survey Assessment of Vietnamese Youth: Key role on a Johns Hopkins team that provided 
technical consultation on the design and analysis of the Second Survey Assessment of Vietnamese 
Youth - a nation-wide household survey of youth in Vietnam. In addition, coordinated series of 
regional meetings on youth development for the UNICEF East Asia and Pacific Regional Office 
(ERPO) in Thailand.  
January, 2006 – April, 2008 Assistant Director, Johns Hopkins Medicine, Baltimore, MD (Selected 
Projects) 
 Tawam Hospital (UAE): Assisted in structuring partnership between Johns Hopkins Medicine and 
Tawam Hospital. Developed plans for the construction of Centers of Excellence; for improvement 
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of patient safety; for strengthening the medical education system; and for expansion of 
community outreach programs.  
 Health Systems Modernization in Eastern Europe: Managed health systems assessment and 
strategy development for the following countries: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Lithuania, Latvia, Slovakia, and Slovenia.   
 Trinidad and Tobago Health Systems Strategy and Evaluation: Coordinated assessment of the 
management structure of the health system at the national and subnational levels and supported 
implementation of human resource strategy to strengthen hospital leadership’s management 
capacities. Active member of the leadership committee, which oversaw the design and 
implementation of $75 million dollar health systems reform project. 
 Tokyo Midtown Medicine Quality Improvement Centers of Excellence: Managed strategic 
partnership with Tokyo Midtown Medicine, an ambulatory clinic affiliated with Johns Hopkins 
Medicine. Oversaw year-long quality assurance project to strengthen patient safety measures.  




 India Micro-Insurance Cooperative: In collaboration with seven Micro Finance Groups (MFIs) 
developed product standards and strategies to provide rural communities with community based 
health insurance.  
 India Insurance Regulatory Reform: Provided technical consultation to strengthen the insurance 
market, with a focus on the following work-streams: health financing innovation, insurance term 
standardization, and data development. Co-authored papers on (1) minimum capital requirements 
for health insurance, (2) roadmap for the establishment of a community based health financing 
resource center, and (3) innovations in managed care.  
 Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Service: Conducted evaluation of the public reporting of 
hospital quality measures; assisted in the development of performance indicators for selected 




 English, Advanced 
 Mandarin Chinese, Native 
 
 
 
 
 
